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Foreword 
 
This dissertation contains two articles in seemingly unrelated areas of 
Financial Economics: financial markets and institutions and mutual funds. While 
these two areas may not appear to be directly related, there are some common 
themes and empirical findings that echo some of the most important concepts in the 
field. In many ways, the main goal of finance is to reduce market frictions that 
hinder the efficient flow of capital in the economy, and a major friction involves 
information problems in the economy.  Accordingly, A main goal of the finance 
discipline is to design mechanisms that reduce market frictions and solve problems 
of incomplete, asymmetric, and uncertain information in the financial markets that, 
if left unchecked, can hinder the flow of capital and, consequently, reduce real 
economic productivity. Undoubtedly, the biggest economic failure in recent times 
has been the financial crisis of 2008. The inability of the financial markets to 
efficiently price complicated new financial instruments led to a period of increased 
risk and uncertainty in the financial markets and, as a result, financial activity fell 
dramatically, resulting in massive financial losses and unemployment.  
The first chapter of this dissertation analyzes the financial sector leading up 
to the financial crisis. The reason financial firms are so heavily regulated in the 
U.S. is in order to ensure that investors feel confident in the financial system and 
that they have enough information to make beneficial economic decisions. However, 
recent trends in financial intermediation including the use of largely unregulated 
derivative products and the growth of a new set of less-regulated financial 
companies can pose significant problems for the efficient flow of information in the 
economy. In an empirical analysis, this chapter provides interesting evidence that 
highlights the role that these trends played in the stability of the U.S. financial 
sector leading up to the financial crisis, and it has implications regarding policy 
changes that may improve information flows in the financial markets. 
 iii
The second chapter examines the relative efficiency of mutual funds in terms 
of how quickly they are able to adjust portfolios in order to achieve better 
performance. Mutual funds have become an important investment vehicle and have 
seen tremendous growth over the past several decades. Mutual funds offer lay 
investors the ability to instantly hold a diversified portfolio and, as a result, mutual 
funds owned by smaller investors in retirement accounts and the like have provided 
a significant amount of capital to the financial markets. Due to the prominence of 
mutual funds, it is important to know whether they are efficiently investing their 
clients’ funds. In particular, mutual fund managers are charged with making 
investments on behalf of their clients, and a key element of this charge is gathering 
and efficiently using information about investment opportunities in order to make 
the best investment decisions. There has been much debate on this subject; 
however, this chapter applies a novel empirical methodology in order to address a 
new aspect of mutual fund efficiency. 
This dissertation, while investigating topics in two different areas of finance, 
shows empirical results related to the importance of information and its efficient 
and productive use. Whether it is used to insure that investors are trading 
securities that are transparent enough for investors to understand their underlying 
risks, or whether it is used by fund managers to acquire specialized information to 
yield high returns for their clients, information is the key to efficiently operating 
financial markets, and it is imperative to design frameworks that promote the 
efficient use of information and reduce other market frictions. The two chapters 
presented in this dissertation provide unique empirical analyses that significantly 
contribute to the literature in the field, and the results have significant implications 
regarding financial reform, regulatory policy, financial institutions and mutual fund 
governance, and optimal investing behavior. 
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Abstract 
 
The following dissertation contains two unique empirical studies that 
contribute to the overall literature in the field of Financial Economics in the areas 
of mutual fund investing and financial intermediation and regulation. The first 
Chapter, entitled “The Impact of Macroeconomic Stress on the U.S. Financial 
Sector”, examines the relative impact of macroeconomic stress on financial and non-
financial U.S. firms. Empirical results show that macroeconomic shocks appear to 
have a larger impact on financial firms. Additionally, the sensitivity of financial 
firms to macroeconomic events can be traced to the influence of non-depository 
institutions, or “shadow banks”, like finance and investment companies, which are 
less regulated than depository institutions. The results coincide with several trends 
in the financial sector including increased competition, complexity and 
interconnectedness and highlight the need for governance mechanisms that account 
for the risks associated with these factors. The second chapter, entitled “Partial 
Adjustment Towards Equilibrium Mutual Fund Allocations: Evidence from U.S.-
based Equity Mutual Funds”, examines the relative efficiency of equity mutual 
funds in terms of speed of portfolio adjustment by applying a partial adjustment 
model. Empirical results show that mutual fund managers are able and willing to 
quickly adjust their portfolios when results have been sub-optimal, implying that 
the cost of persistent poor performance is perceived as being high. Managers can 
offset about 106 percent of the deviation within one period. Additionally, results 
show that funds that typically engage in the costly production of specialized 
information, like emerging market and sector funds have more efficient speeds of 
portfolio adjustment than more passive funds, like market index funds.  The results 
imply that actively managed funds may have efficiency advantages that have been 
previously ignored in the empirical literature.  
Keywords: Financial crises, Financial institutions, Policy, Regulation, Financial 
markets, Mutual Funds, Partial Adjustment Models, Active Portfolio Management, 
Mutual Fund Performance and Efficiency 
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1. The Impact of Macroeconomic Stress on the U.S. 
Financial Sector 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The stability and efficiency of the financial sector has gained increased 
scrutiny in light of the 2008 financial crisis and corresponding “Great Recession”. 
The consequences of the collapse of many financial institutions were not confined to 
Wall Street.  The failure of the financial sector in handling increasing financial 
stress contributed to a worldwide economic slowdown. As a result, countless 
investors, pension funds, and corporations realized losses in the trillions of dollars, 
and millions of people became unemployed. The effects of this downturn are still 
being felt years later.  The real sector consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 
illustrate the important role that financial intermediaries play in ensuring a stable 
and efficient economy.  Not surprisingly, there has been an increased focus on the 
financial sector in the wake of the global financial crisis, as stakeholders around the 
world study the causes of the crisis and contemplate which solutions, if any, could 
be employed to prevent similar occurrences in the future.   
Efficiently functioning capital markets are paramount to generating and 
sustaining real economic growth, and financial intermediaries play an important 
role in developing and maintaining healthy capital markets.  The consequences of a 
financial system collapse became apparent in the aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008.  Accordingly, there have been continued efforts over many years to 
increase the efficiency and stability of the financial services sector.  Since the 1980s, 
deregulation in the U.S. markets and liberalization policies in emerging markets 
have coincided with a growing degree of international market integration and 
robust growth in emerging economies.  Proponents of many of these financial 
reforms that favor open and less restrictive markets may take credit for some of the 
successes of what seems to be improved international market efficiency and growth. 
However, the recent financial crisis points to the fact that the increasingly 
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integrated and complex financial system appears to carry with it a great deal of risk 
that is still perhaps not yet fully recognized. 
The typical financial intermediary holds assets that are funded with 
liabilities of a different maturity. Accordingly, the majority of risk in the financial 
sector stems from the uncertainty surrounding the value of the firm’s assets relative 
to its liabilities as economic variables such as interest and exchange rates fluctuate.  
Additionally, since many financial firms leverage their liabilities by making risky 
investments, they often also face significant liquidity and default risks.  To avoid 
excess losses from these and other sources of risk, many financial intermediaries 
have increasingly relied on the use derivative securities to hedge their asset 
portfolios. Additionally, the financial sector has faced an increasingly friendly 
regulatory environment with regards to the designing and implementation of 
derivative securities. On one hand, the use of derivatives allows financial 
intermediaries to transfer risk and insure against both default and price risk, 
resulting in less uncertainty in the capital markets.  On the other hand, trading in 
redundant securities may not lead to any economic benefits, and may in fact only be 
serving to skirt regulations aimed at controlling financial asset risk through the use 
of off balance sheet activities. In addition, the difficulty in pricing complex 
derivatives may add yet another level of unanticipated risk to a financial 
institution’s balance sheet.   
The potential risks posed by the failure of the financial system are 
compounded by the unprecedented consolidation that has taken place within the 
financial sector over the past several decades.  Regulations limiting commercial 
banking branching across state lines were relaxed in the 1990s, resulting in 
increased mergers and acquisitions in commercial banking activities. Additionally, 
regulations such as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 allowed for 
the creation of bank holding companies, which are allowed to hold both depository 
and non-depository institutions. The increased consolidation in the financial sector 
can allow financial firms to become more efficient. Larger financial institutions are 
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able to more easily diversify and can benefit from economies of scale and scope. On 
the other hand, consolidating financial assets also poses significant risks, because 
the failure of an individual financial institution has a much larger potential impact 
on the real sector1. 
This chapter focuses on the impact of macroeconomic shocks and financial 
market stress on the financial services sector.  The translation of macroeconomic 
events into corporate earnings or asset price appreciation or depreciation is a 
complex and dynamic process.  However, we use previous studies as a guide to 
building an empirical model that generalizes that process. Through the use of 
univariate tests as well as static and dynamic panel data techniques, we use both 
firm-specific and macroeconomic data to study the degree to which the financial 
sector is sensitive to macroeconomic distress. The fragility of the financial sector 
relative to other sectors of the economy has important implications for financial 
sector governance. Financial firms in general are subject to a much deeper set of 
regulations, the purpose of which is to reduce risk-taking and ensure stable and 
trustworthy institutions.  From this perspective, we may expect that financial 
services firms should be relatively immune from financial shocks in the economy. 
Regulatory requirements ensuring proper capitalization as well as their use of 
complex derivative products for hedging risk should ensure the stability of financial 
intermediaries.   
However, the recent financial crisis begs the question as to whether this is 
indeed the case. The loosening of many regulations over the past several decades 
may have worked to offset some of the risk reduction benefits established by 
previous legislation.  Additionally, innovations in the financial sector may 
contribute to an increasingly risky financial environment. The most highly 
regulated institutions, depository institutions, have traditionally been a major 
source of financial activity. However, financial innovations and practices have 
                                                        
1 Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2013) use data from the Spanish banking system to show empirical 
support for a convex relationship between bank competition and risk, indicating that there is an 
optimal level of banking competition that minimizes risk. 
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shifted much of this activity to the non-depository or “shadow” banks.  These trends 
induced risks into the financial system that were some of the major causes of the 
global financial crisis, and it is questionable as to whether current regulations and 
governance practices have evolved to sufficiently offset these risks.   
The severe moral hazard issues perpetuating financial institutions that lead 
to the dramatic failures seen during the financial crisis have brought about a 
renewed scrutiny from public policy makers in the United States. For example, The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 aims to 
improve the stability of the financial system in the United States through reforms 
to the regulatory mechanisms that govern financial institutions. The act aims to 
improve the financial regulatory regime by taking a more holistic or macro- 
prudential approach to regulation. Among the many changes taking place under the 
Dodd-Frank Act are the consolidation and collaboration of regulatory agencies, an 
increased focus on the risks posed by derivative securities, transparency 
requirements with regards to consumer financial products, and a focus on overall 
systemic risk.  Accordingly, the Act gives supervisors the authority to regulate 
financial institutions that have historically been left relatively unregulated by 
substantial external governance, such as finance companies and investment 
banks.  This paper contributes to the literature in this area, as the results 
presented highlight several key facets of the financial services industry that have 
motivated such attempts at increased regulatory scrutiny.  
 We analyze the relative performance of the financial sector in order to 
determine whether firm performance is more consistent with a financial sector that 
is robust to economic conditions or is consistent with an increasingly complex and 
risky financial market. In light of the results, the fragility of the financial sector 
seen during the recent financial crises is not surprising.  The study significantly 
contributes to the literature in several ways. Previous studies have separately 
analyzed the impact of financial stress on financial and real sector firms. 
Additionally, there has been previous literature describing the causes of real and 
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financial sector instability. This study extends this literature by directly comparing 
the relative impact of economic distress on financial and nonfinancial institutions. 
This allows us to link changes in the comparative sensitivity of financial sector 
firms to economic stress to recent trends in the global financial markets. 
Furthermore, in a more detailed analysis of the financial sector, we identify the 
types of financial firms that are driving financial market instability.  The results 
presented are of particular interest to academics and practitioners interested in 
evaluating and designing regulatory and governance mechanisms aimed at more 
accurately measuring and controlling the risks taken by financial intermediaries. 
The results show that financial sector profitability is extremely sensitive to 
the macroeconomic regime.  The average profitability of a financial firm is 
significantly higher than the average real sector firm in normal economic times. 
However, the results show that the specific impact of a recession or financial 
market stress on financial firms can be significantly worse than that of other 
industries. Furthermore, we trace the source of this sensitivity to non-depository 
financial institutions such as financial services firms, investment companies, 
insurance, and finance companies. This has implications as to the effectiveness of 
the current risk management and corporate governance mechanisms in place within 
the finance industry as well as the regulatory bodies aimed at ensuring stable 
markets. The results are consistent with many of the goals of the recent Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which, among 
other things, focuses on the reduction of risks posed by exotic financial products and 
the systemic risks posed by non-depository financial institutions. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we provide a review of the 
literature regarding the impact of macroeconomic news on firm and stock 
performance of both financial and non-financial firms, including the impact of 
financial crises. Section 1.3 describes the methodology used in the empirical 
analysis. Section 1.4 describes the data used in the empirical models. Section 1.5 
describes the relative impact of financial distress on financial firm profitability. 
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Section 1.6 extends the analysis to the effect of financial distress on the cross-
section of stock returns. Section 1.7 conducts a further examination of the financial 
services industry. Section 1.8 discuses robustness issues and presents potential 
areas of future research.  Section 1.9 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review 
This paper combines several lines of literature that relate to the 
determinants of firm and economic growth in both the financial and real sectors and 
examines how they are affected by economic downturns and financial crises.  Past 
research has attempted to describe the process by which economic fundamentals are 
transmitted through the financial system and their impact on real and financial 
sector asset prices and performance.  Additionally, much recent literature has 
focused on the impact of financial market distress in light of increasing 
international market interdependency.  The following review of the literature on 
these topics illustrates the current state of empirical research.  
1.2.1 Macroeconomic conditions and interest/exchange rates 
The driving force behind efficiently operating financial markets is the ability 
of financial intermediaries to properly price and transfer capital to the real economy 
through the supply and demand for domestic and foreign currencies.   As interest 
and exchange rates adjust to equilibrium, financial intermediaries must adjust 
their positions to reflect new information imputed into the supply and demand for 
real capital.  In this sense, the essential mechanism upon which the financial sector 
relies is influenced by the macroeconomic conditions underlying the real economy.  
This relationship illustrates the importance of identifying the relationship between 
real economic activity and the supply and demand for capital, and an extensive 
literature has focused on the impact of macroeconomic events on domestic and 
foreign interest and exchange rates. As the largest economy in the world, economic 
progress in the United States has been a key driver of global capital demand, and 
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many studies focus on the impact of U.S. macroeconomic news on domestic and 
foreign interest and exchange rates. 
Among the many studies along this line, Frenkel (1981)2 examines the effect 
of “news” on interest and exchange rates in the wake of the establishment of the 
modern, floating exchange rate system developed in the 1970s and finds that 
macroeconomic news is essential in the determination of foreign exchange and 
interest rates. Important economic events like unexpected inflation are implied to 
be the type of news that determines the size and direction of interest rate changes.   
More recent studies have extended the literature to more accurately define the 
relationship between economic news and its impact on the cost of funds.  For 
example, measures that reflect underlying economic growth such as GDP growth, 
retail sales, inflation, and monetary policy stance are positively related to interest 
rate changes (Faust et al. (2003)3). Along similar lines, Neely and Dey (2010) 
provide a review of the literature showing that macroeconomic news from several 
major economies similarly effect foreign exchange rates as well4.  Additionally, 
Bellas, Papaioannou, and Petrova (2010) find that financial stress can have a 
significant impact on sovereign bond yields.  
1.2.2 The Determinants of financial sector stock prices and profitability 
Aside from having an impact on overall economic growth, macroeconomic 
news has also been shown to impact the operating and stock performance of 
financial intermediaries.  Due to the important role of financial intermediaries in 
matching the supply and demand for money at correct prices, firms in the financial 
sector are particularly affected by changes in underlying macroeconomic conditions.  
                                                        
2 While “news” in this model is defined as innovations in interest rates, the model is general enough 
to define “news” as any significant, unanticipated change in a key economic variable that will affect 
asset prices or cash flows. 
3 They find that the effect of price “surprises on interest rates has declined over the period of 1987 to 
2002. 
4 Other studies also show the impact of U.S. and international fundamental news on foreign 
exchange rates in the context of emerging markets (Özataya, Özmenb, & Şahinbeyoğluc (2007), 
Emir, Özatay, and Şahinbeyoğluc (2005). 
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This fact underscores the importance of a financial firm’s ability to anticipate, react 
to, and hedge against both expected and unexpected changes in real economic 
production.  The literature shows that both idiosyncratic factors and macroeconomic 
factors influence financial sector performance.  One such line relates to the stock 
price performance of financial firms, while another relates to the performance of 
financial firms, typically measured by some ratio such as profit margin or return on 
assets (ROA).  
The effect of interest rate changes on the stock price performance of financial 
firms is tested empirically by Flannery and James (1984).  They find that the 
common stock returns of financial companies are associated with unanticipated 
changes in key interest rates.  A positive coefficient between unanticipated interest 
rate changes and the return on bank stock indexes is consistent with the idea that 
the decrease in equity capital caused by maturity mismatch increases the investors’ 
required return.  An alternative explanation is that increased interest rates are also 
associated with the contractionary monetary policies indicative of good overall 
economic performance.   Flannery and James (1984) find a link between of the 
magnitude of this affect and the maturity mismatch of assets and liabilities that 
tend to occur in the financial sector. Claire and Courtenay (2002) also show that 
changes in interest rate policy and monetary actions are incorporated into financial 
contract prices5.  Staikouras (2005) extends similar results to the sample of U.K. 
firms.  Similarly, Ewing (2002) develops an impulse response model to measure the 
sensitivity of the NASDAQ Financial 100 to changes in key macroeconomic 
variables. Key variables used to explain financial firm performance are the Fed 
Funds rate, as a proxy for monetary policy position, the spread between Baa and 
Aaa bonds, as a measure of default risk, and the Consumer Price Index. 
Additionally, Bernoth and Pick (2011) find that the long-term rate of interest is 
consistently found to be an important factor in distance to default for both banks 
and insurance companies. 
                                                        
5 They show, however, that the announcement effect has weakened over time. 
 9
Real macroeconomic variables also influence the operating performance of 
financial firms.  Williams (2003) shows that return on assets (ROA) is associated 
with GDP growth. Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and Delis (2005) find that business 
cycle effects and inflation are important determinants of bank profits as well. 
Bernoth and Pick (2011) extend their study to include both banks and insurance 
companies in a model that also includes the long term bond rate, inflation, 
industrial production growth, equity market growth, unemployment, and GDP 
growth. 
A final piece in accurately modeling the cross-section of financial firm 
performance is firm-specific or idiosyncratic factors.  While macroeconomic 
conditions like GDP and inflation affect the overall business environment in which 
financial firms operate, the decisions of management can influence how well the 
financial institution is able to anticipate and take advantage of the external 
economic conditions.  Individual firm decisions like capital structure and payout 
policy can affect the firm’s ability to operate efficiently in a given economy.  
Hoffman (2011) finds that a higher capital ratio is associated with lower 
profitability and lower firm size, measured by the log of assets.  The literature 
relating to the profitability and stock returns for financial sector firms presents 
several theoretical motivations for both macroeconomic and firm-specific factors 
determining profitability and stock return.  The empirical results throughout the 
world show strong evidence that these effects are significant in the observed data. 
Accordingly, many researchers incorporate both effects into models of bank 
profitability.  For example, Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and Delis (2005) model bank 
profitability as a function of firm-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic 
factors. 
1.2.3 Macroeconomic news and stock returns 
The literature also documents a similar relationship between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the stock performance of firms in the real economy.  Fama (1990) 
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concludes that nearly half of the return variance of NYSE stocks is explained by 
variables intended to measure macroeconomic growth prospects. Schwert (1990) 
extends the Fama (1990) results to include data ranging from 1889 to 1988. Their 
extension shows the persistent effect of anticipated economic fundamentals on real 
sector stock returns. The consistent finding over such a long sample period makes it 
unlikely that the results are a product of sample selection. Model specifications by 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) show that the long and short-term interest rate spread, 
inflation, industrial production, and high-low grade bond spread have an important 
impact on the performance of NYSE stocks6. Their findings notably show a positive 
relationship in stock price reactions to changes in industrial production as well as 
increases in the risk premium, as traditional financial theories suggest.   
McQueen and Roley (1993) find a relationship between daily returns and 
economic news when significant macroeconomic events like the position within the 
business cycle are taken into account7. More recently, Funke and Matsuda (2006) 
study the impact of macroeconomic events on the stock returns of U.S. and German 
stocks.  Similar to Ewing (2002), they use current data relating to the state of the 
economy, such as growth in the gross domestic product to explain stock returns.  
Additionally, they use supposed leading indicators of economic activity such as 
consumer confidence indices, interest rates, and consumer prices.  The main 
findings of the paper suggest that monetary policy news such as changes in 
consumer prices and interest rates have the largest impact on real stock price 
movements. In addition, similar to McQueen and Roley (1993), they also find 
evidence of some asymmetric reaction of the stock market to certain types of news, 
conditional upon the state of the economy.  For example, the authors find that real 
economic news has a larger impact on stock prices during times of recession than in 
                                                        
6 They do not find that consumption has much explanatory power. 
7 In general, McQueen and Roley (1993) do not ascribe the same direct link between macroeconomic 
news and daily stock returns and point to other studies that show daily asset prices seem 
unresponsive to most macroeconomic news. They find a very state-dependent relationship between 
economic news and stock prices.  Stock prices react positively to positive economic news when the 
economy is weak, but the relationship is reversed then the economy is already experiencing growth.  
State-invariant discount rates are one explanation as to why this relationship is observed. 
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expansionary periods.  Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) also include real GDP, 
consumer prices, money supply, and employment in a model describing stock 
prices8.   
1.2.4 Financial Crisis, Contagion, and the Real economy 
There is also a line of literature that establishes the relationship between 
financial crises and recessions and the performance of financial and real sector 
firms. Allen and Carletti (2013) point out that very little attention had been paid on 
the role of financial crises in financial sector performance leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2008. The lack of focus on the banking and macro-prudential systems and 
their impact on systemic economic stability leading up to the financial crisis can be 
viewed as one of the major precipitators of the recent crisis. There is a line of 
research that provides empirical evidence on the impact of crisis events on financial 
and real sector performance and stability. 
Several studies look at the effects of the Asian crisis on financial firm 
performance. Kutan, Muradoglu, and Sudjana (2012) look at IMF news and the 
impact on the real and financial sectors during the Asian crisis. They find that IMF 
news impacts the returns of the financial sector significantly, but that the real 
sector economy was less responsive. Borensztein and Lee (2002) show that 
profitability is a key factor in the ability of financial sector firms to access credit 
during the Korean credit crisis.  Sufian and Habibullah (2010) focus on the 
performance of Indonesian banks during the Indonesian financial crisis.  They 
utilize a panel data model, and the main dependent performance variable in their 
model is Return on Assets (ROA). Another bank-specific measure used in this study 
is the size of the bank.  Naturally, external factors affecting bank profitability are 
also included. They include measures of economic growth such as GDP, bank asset 
concentration, and crisis dummy variables.  It is determined that larger banks tend 
                                                        
8 The authors find that several inflation measures, including the CPI, balance of trade, 
unemployment, and money supply, significantly affect aggregate stock returns. 
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to make lower profits. Not surprisingly, they find that financial crises have a 
significant, negative impact on bank performance.     
There is also a growing literature examining the effects of the recent global 
recession.  Recent evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 shows the 
increasing impact of financial market failures on the real economies across the 
world. Virtually no economy or sector was spared the reach of the recent recession 
(Baur (2011)9).  Bernoth and Pick (2011) point out the importance of the inter-
linkages between firms in the financial sector.  The inter-linkages not only between 
commercial banks, but also between commercial banks and other financial firms, 
such as insurance companies, have a significant impact on the systemic risk of the 
global financial system.  
Bolt et al. (2010) look at bank profitability in light of the recent 2008 financial 
crisis and find a pro-cyclical link between bank profits and the economy. However, 
they find that the relationship is nonlinear in that severe recessions have a 
pronounced impact on bank profitability. They argue that higher-than-expected 
asset value and loan losses account for this affect.  Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010) 
examine Swiss banks during the recent crisis and find that better capitalized banks 
tend to be more profitable. They do not find a significant relation between bank 
profitability and GDP, but do find that stock market capitalization and the term 
structure of interest rates are important.  Van den End and Tabbae (2012) show 
that liquidity plays an important role in the banking system during a financial 
crisis. When faced with liquidity problems, banks typically follow a “pecking order” 
in which they adjust the most liquid, or short-term, assets on the balance sheet 
first. However, the study shows that, during the recent financial crisis, banks did 
not engage in this behavior and often opted to adjust less liquid assets, which can 
have a systemic affect on the flow of capital to the economy. 
                                                        
9 Baur (2011) shows that the Healthcare, Telecommunications, and Technology sectors were 
relatively less affected by the recent Global Financial Crisis. 
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The cyclical nature of bank profits may be exacerbated by current banking 
regulatory paradigms as well as the increased interdependence of the global 
financial system (Blejer (2006)). Specifically, Nijskens and Wagner (2011) document 
a significant increase in financial stock betas with the advent of new methods of 
transferring credit risk, such as mortgage backed securities, CDSs and CLOs. These 
instruments essentially transfer credit risk from individual lenders to the financial 
system as a whole. The increased betas may be a reflection of the market’s 
anticipation of the increased risk inherent in the financial system due to the use of 
these new securities, some of which pose significant off balance sheet risk. They also 
point to the possible need for more comprehensive regulations that take into 
account an institution’s impact on systemic risk. Similar evidence linking financial 
product innovations to banking sector instability is provided by Dewally and Shao 
(2013). They find an empirical link between a bank’s use of interest rate and foreign 
exchange derivatives and co-movement between the firm’s stock returns and those 
of the market, an indication of increased systematic risk. In addition, they also link 
a financial firm’s use of financial derivatives with the risk of a future stock price 
crash. Finally, López-Espinosa et al. (2013) examine how different types of banking 
activities affect institutional as well as systemic risk. They recommend a strong 
balance between micro and macro-prudential oversight in order to ensure a stable 
banking system. In addition, Masciandaro, Pansini, and Quintyn (2013) link 
regulatory regime with financial sector risk and conclude that supervision needs to 
be “more intrusive, proactive, risk-based, and result oriented” in order to avoid the 
risks seen during the financial crisis.  Overall, the empirical evidence relating bank 
risk-taking behaviors to systemic financial and economic risk shows that industry 
trends, such as consolidation and financial innovation, as well as the regulatory 
environment can have a significant impact on the spillover of financial risk to the 
banking industry and the real economy. 
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1.3 Methodology 
A main goal of this study is to compare the degree to which financial and non-
financial firms are affected by macroeconomic shocks and financial crises. We 
expect all firms to be significantly affected by economic slowdowns and credit crises. 
However, their impact on financial firms is of particular importance, since a 
stagnant financial sector can have dramatic real sector implications, because 
financial sector weakness impedes the efficient allocation of real capital.  We seek to 
develop a framework that compares the impact of financial distress on the 
performance of different types of firms. Significant results showing that 
macroeconomic stress impacts the financial sector differently than it affects non-
financial firms has important regulatory and governance implications as well.   
As part of this framework, we first present an analysis that examines the 
impact of macroeconomic shocks on firm profitability in section 1.5.  As part of this 
initial analysis, a univariate analysis is conducted that examines the impact of a 
macroeconomic recession on several key firm fundamentals and compare the level 
differences in performance caused by a recession between financial and non-
financial firms.   The univariate analysis is followed by a series of multivariate 
regression estimations that attempt to more accurately define the role that financial 
shocks play in firm profitability.  The baseline multivariate model is one that 
models firm performance as a combination of firm-specific and macroeconomic 
variables, along the lines of Sufian and Habibullah (2010).  However, a set of 
variables aimed at examining the specific impact of financial market distress on 
certain types of firms is added to the specification.  The econometric estimation 
utilizes a panel data approach of the general form: 
 	
,    ,  ,  ,   , (1.1) 
In section 1.5, static fixed-effect as well as dynamic panel estimation 
procedures are employed to allow for significant cross-sectional differences among 
firms.  A test for different intercepts rejects the hypothesis of a pooled panel data 
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approach at the one percent level.  Additionally, a series of Hausman tests show 
that a random effects estimation procedure is likely inappropriate for the parameter 
estimation.   
In our baseline multivariate model, it is assumed that firm performance, 
measured by profit margin, is a function of several key firm-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants.  The firm-specific factors included in the model are 
the log of total assets, the debt ratio (total assets divided by total liabilities), and 
lagged profit margin. The macroeconomic factors include inflation, measured by the 
CPI for all urban consumers, real GDP growth, the Fed Funds rate, the spread 
between the Fed Funds rate and the 10-year constant-maturity treasury bond, and 
a set of quarterly dummy variables.  Also included are a set of distress or crisis 
variables, namely a recession dummy variable and the Chicago Federal Reserve’s 
Financial Conditions Index.  It is the sign and significance of these two variables 
and their interactions with firm-type dummy variables that drive many of the 
conclusions in this chapter. 
In section 1.6, as a robustness check, the analysis is extended to the cross-
section of stock returns.  It is assumed that, if the firm profitability model presented 
in section 1.5 is correctly specified, then the influence of the deterministic factors 
should also be significant in explaining the cross-section of stock returns.  However, 
it is expected that the results should be weaker for a model of stock returns, 
because the market should be able to more efficiently adjust to changes in perceived 
risk than the individual firm.  Additionally, investors should also be able to 
diversify away firm and industry specific risks. In the stock returns analysis, the 
same panel ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effect methodology described above is 
employed. 
In section 1.7, the empirical analysis continues with a more detailed 
accounting of the financial firm results.  In this section, the financial sector firms 
are divided by SIC code into 6 sub-industries: depository institutions, finance 
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companies, financial services, insurance, real estate, and investment companies.  
The multivariate, panel data regression framework is applied to the financial sub-
sectors in order to examine how different types of financial institutions react to 
financial stress.  The analysis compares the results of the same regressions for 
different types of financial institutions. In addition, a set of industry interaction 
dummy variables is utilized in order to directly compare the effects of economic 
distress across the sub-sectors in a nested model.  Here, the signs and significance 
of the coefficients that compare different types of financial sector firms to their non-
financial counterparts are directly observable. 
1.4 The Data 
Following the literature, we collect data on the variables commonly found to 
be associated with the profitability and stock performance of financial and real 
sector firms. As in Sufian and Habibullah (2010) and others, we include both firm-
specific data and well as macroeconomic variables. 
All firm-level data are collected from COMPUSTAT.  These data include 
information on firm size, profitability, and leverage.  Likewise, all macroeconomic 
time series data are collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database.  
These data include real gross domestic product growth, inflation, measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Fed Funds interest rate, and the rate on the ten 
year U.S. constant-maturity Treasury bond.  Also included are measures that proxy 
for macroeconomic and financial crises. A dummy variable indicates whether the 
given observation falls under an NBER-defined recession. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research does not have a precise definition for a recession, but an NBER-
defined recession is a period ranging from a few months to a year whereby economic 
productivity falls enough to have a significant impact on the U.S. economy.  This 
measure is less restrictive than the formal definition of a recession. Therefore, it can 
account for periods of distress that will significantly affect firm performance, but 
may not fit the technical definition of a recession. The Federal Reserve’s Financial 
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Condition Index another measure of macroeconomic stress. The Federal Reserve’s 
Financial Condition Index measures the overall financial status of the economy, 
including risk and liquidity. It considers stock and bond market conditions, as well 
as liquidity and conditions within the shadow banking system. Normal financial 
conditions are represented by a value of zero, while a level above zero represents 
higher than average stress, and a level below zero represents lower than average 
stress. Hence, a negative regression coefficient for this variable can be interpreted 
as increasing financial stress being associated with a decrease in firm performance.  
The firm-level data are filtered to reduce the impact of outliers and data 
errors.  All firm-level data are sampled quarterly from 1980Q1 through 2010Q4. 
Sample firms are required to have revenues greater than $500 thousand and total 
assets greater than $1 million.  Also, all firm-quarter observations must contain the 
complete set of variables used in our baseline model on order to be included in the 
sample. For example, an observation with a missing value for the debt ratio is 
excluded.  Each sample firm must also have at least eight quarters of complete 
data. As a final measure of ensuring a representative sample, the data are 
windsorized at the one percent level of the dependent variable, profit margin, for 
each tail every year. This has the effect of eliminating many extreme observations 
that are likely the result of extraordinary performance or errors in the data.  
The final sample contains 607,588 firm-quarter observations for a sample of 
17,591 firms. Table 1.1 presents some sample statistics for the U.S. firms in the 
COMPUSTAT sample.  Summary statistics are presented for several key variables 
for the entire sample, each decade, and for each single-digit SIC-classification 
industry.  The data show that financial firms average a higher level of total assets 
with a sample average of $16.2 billion, compared with the full sample average of 
$3.7 billion.  The standard deviation of total assets is higher for financial firms, 
however.  Financial firms on average also have higher revenues with $487 million, 
compared with the full sample average of $444 million. However, the standard 
deviation of financial firm revenues is lower than that of the full sample.  Financial 
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firms are able to generate an average net income of about $36 million on revenues 
for a profit margin of 11.2 percent, compared with 3.01 percent for the full sample.  
Financial firms have higher average debt ratios than the full sample with 63.3 
percent and 53.6 percent, respectively.  Financial firms also exhibit higher average 
ROE, retained earnings, and cash, but lower levels of capital expenditures.  
Table 1.1 also divides the full sample into decades.  Profit margins for all 
firms appear to decrease over time from an average margin of 4.97 percent during 
the 1980s to 1.52 percent during the 2000s. There are similar uniform decreases in 
both ROE and ROA. Conversely, the market-to-book values for the full sample of 
firms increase from 1.02 in the 1980s to 1.52 in the 2000s.  This reflects the 
dramatic increase in average profits earned, from $12 million in the 1980s to $44 
million in the 2000s. 
The dependent variable in our main profitability analysis is profit margin.  
Figure 1.1 compares the profit margins of financial firms, defined as firms having 
SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, with those of non-financial firms over the 
1980Q1 to 2010Q4 sample period.  The figure illustrates the fact that financial firm 
profit margins are consistently higher than those of non-financial firms, as 
previously implied by Table 1.1.  There is also a significant degree of variation in 
the profit margin time series for financial firms, compared with that of non-
financial firms, especially around the recent global financial crisis.  The figure also 
shows a significant amount of seasonality in the data. We incorporate lagged profit 
margin and quarterly dummy variables in our multivariate regressions to account 
for seasonality and persistence. 
For the stock returns analysis presented in section 1.6, monthly stock return 
data from the CRSP database over the same 1980 through 2010 period are 
analyzed.  Accordingly, monthly observations of the key macroeconomic variables, 
GDP growth, Fed Funds, etc., and distress variables, NBER recession dummy and 
Financial Condition Index, are collected.  The monthly data is then matched with 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics             
The following are descriptive statistics on a sample of COMPUSTAT firms, sampled quarterly 
from 1980Q1 through 2010Q4. The data includes all firms with revenues of more than $500K 
and is windsorized in each tail at the one percentile. The sample also requires each firm to have 
at least 8 quarters of complete data. 
            SIC Industry  
    Full Sample 1980s 1990s 2000s 000-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 
Total Assets 
Mean 3,708 1,147 2,129 6,865 795 1,287 3,045 
Std. Dev. 33,965 5,073 13,138 52,944 1,928 4,081 13,398 
Revenue 
Mean 444 227 299 723 195 191 771 
Std. Dev. 2,213 946 1,325 3,218 402 588 3,678 
Net Income 
Mean 25 12 15 44 7 18 54 
Std. Dev. 200 59 98 303 65 116 354 
Profit Margin (%) 
Mean 3.01 4.97 3.27 1.52 2.65 4.25 2.00 
Std. Dev. 17.94 10.31 15.05 23.38 23.51 22.77 16.89 
ROA (%) 
Mean 0.82 1.25 0.86 0.50 1.00 0.86 1.05 
Std. Dev. 2.80 2.09 2.72 3.21 2.89 2.53 2.84 
ROE (%) 
Mean 2.37 2.97 2.40 1.96 2.37 2.05 2.77 
Std. Dev. 8.84 6.54 8.60 10.22 8.80 7.47 9.06 
Debt Ratio (%) 
Mean 53.63 54.05 54.01 52.99 48.28 49.02 51.82 
Std. Dev. 26.04 22.08 26.44 27.90 23.60 23.00 24.93 
Market Cap 
Mean 1,906 533 1,288 3,304 965 1,284 3,576 
Std. Dev. 10,645 2,228 7,156 15,244 4,227 5,006 17,037 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Mean 1.52 1.02 1.97 1.52 1.15 1.45 1.61 
Std. Dev. 1.13 0.26 1.39 1.13 0.59 0.91 1.11 
Capital Expenditures 
Mean 84 40 57 127 20 102 129 
Std. Dev. 581 228 409 780 59 419 858 
Retained Earnings 
Mean 404 218 250 670 66 234 947 
Std. Dev. 3,559 1,076 1,454 5,471 366 1,343 6,553 
Cash 
Mean 336 22 47 426 108 181 522 
  Std. Dev. 2,190 61 143 2,485 314 571 2,043 
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Table 1.1 (cont.): Summary Statistics 
  SIC Industry 
    
3000-
3999 
4000-
4999 
5000-
5999 
6000-
6999 
7000-
7999 
8000-
8999 
9000-
9999 
Total Assets 
Mean 1,556 4,693 1,158 16,215 846 512 13,713 
Std. Dev. 10,876 12,829 5,220 95,149 4,478 1,653 72,499 
Revenue 
Mean 352 582 568 487 158 133 1,282 
Std. Dev. 2,013 1,587 2,615 1,963 922 434 5,306 
Net Income 
Mean 14 39 14 36 10 5 98 
Std. Dev. 135 186 96 243 123 30 554 
Profit Margin (%) 
Mean 1.42 4.94 1.36 11.20 -0.36 1.54 -1.50 
Std. Dev. 15.71 16.90 8.43 21.84 22.02 15.06 20.82 
ROA (%) 
Mean 0.85 0.76 0.86 0.84 0.48 0.83 -0.06 
Std. Dev. 3.05 2.02 2.57 2.02 3.65 2.94 3.49 
ROE (%) 
Mean 2.13 2.75 2.58 2.70 1.74 2.46 1.49 
Std. Dev. 8.65 8.41 9.52 6.83 10.49 9.71 12.00 
Debt Ratio (%) 
Mean 47.30 63.45 57.27 63.78 49.17 52.87 56.37 
Std. Dev. 26.26 20.20 24.39 26.50 28.24 26.90 27.73 
Market Cap 
Mean 1,300 2,900 1,241 2,087 1,354 545 8,671 
Std. Dev. 7,244 9,828 7,431 9,273 10,874 1,744 42,482 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Mean 1.51 1.31 1.54 1.30 1.87 1.73 1.27 
Std. Dev. 0.96 0.68 1.53 1.01 1.53 1.19 0.76 
Capital Expenditures 
Mean 54 244 45 63 33 17 241 
Std. Dev. 558 749 260 642 235 68 1,210 
Retained 
Earnings 
Mean 269 350 270 722 73 40 2,493 
Std. Dev. 2,502 3,080 1,747 3,981 1,651 457 12,480 
Cash 
Mean 382 131 206 1,195 211 94 6,512 
  Std. Dev. 1,581 548 814 5,775 838 286 14,923 
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Figure 1.1: Firm Profitability 
This figure depicts the average profitability of our sample firms from 1980Q1 to 2010Q4. Average Profit 
margin (NI/Sales) per quarter for non-financial firms are compared with those of financial firms. 
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the firm-specific, COMPUSTAT quarterly data.  The same filtering procedure is 
applied in order to ensure the stock return data are free from the influence of 
outliers and data entry errors. The final sample for the stock returns analysis 
contains 1,631,313 firm-month observations over 15,676 firms. 
1.5 The Impact of Economic Stress on Profitability 
In this section, The results pertaining to the determinants of firm 
profitability are presented, and the focus is on the differences between financial 
firms and non-financial firms in times of economic distress.  Several statistical 
analyses are used to compare the operating results of financial firms with those of 
non-financial firms. Different methodologies, including univariate difference of 
means tests, static fixed effect multivariate regression estimation, and dynamic 
panel data estimation are employed. 
1.5.1 Univariate Analysis 
A difference of means analysis is presented in Table 1.2. The table splits the 
firm-level sample into two groups: financial firms and non-financial firms, as 
defined by SIC code. The recession means are compared with the non-recession 
means for key firm statistics for each sample across the entire sample period. We 
compare the magnitude of the differences between the financial firms and those of 
non-financial firms as an indicator of the effect of a recession across these sectors of 
the economy. 
Two interesting results are presented in Table 1.2. Firstly, we again note the 
fact that firm profitability measured by profit margin is typically higher for 
financial firms. During non-recession periods, financial firms have an average 
quarterly profit margin of 11.8 percent, while the non-financial firm average profit 
margin is 2.3 percent.  Not surprisingly, both financial and non-financial firms 
experience significant decreases in profitability during periods of recession, as profit 
margin, ROE and ROA are all significantly lower. Another key result, however, is  
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Table 1.2: Difference of means during Recessions               
The following are difference of means tests on the sample of COMPUSTAT firms, sampled quarterly from 1980Q1 through 2010Q4. The 
data includes all firms with revenues of more than $500K and total assets greater than $1M. The sample is windsorized in each tail at the 
one percentile. The sample also requires each firm to have at least 8 quarters of complete data. Recession means are compared with non-
recession means 
Non-Financial Firms Financial Firms (SIC 6000-6999) 
Variable 
Non-
Recession 
Mean 
Recession 
Mean Difference P-value   
Non-
Recession 
Mean 
Recession 
Mean Difference P-value 
Total Assets 2053.9 2710.1 656.2  <.0001 15444.3 21564.4 6120.1  <.0001 
Revenue 423.3 542.7 119.4  <.0001 470.6 597.6 127.0 <.0001 
Net Income 23.9 25.2 1.3 0.1758 39.3 14.2 -25.1  <.0001 
Profit Margin 2.261 0.210 -2.052  <.0001 11.772 7.236 -4.536  <.0001 
ROA 0.856 0.529 -0.328   <.0001 0.879 0.578 -0.301  <.0001 
ROE 2.399 1.884 -0.516   <.0001 2.809 1.957 -0.852  <.0001 
Debt Ratio 52.305 52.675 0.370 0.0001 63.637 64.766 1.129  <.0001 
Market Cap 1849.3 2096.3 247   <.0001 2066.1 2232.5 166.4 0.1242 
Market-to-Book 1.62 1.37 -0.26  <.0001 1.33 1.19 -0.14 <.0001 
Capital Expenditures 79.5 128.1 48.6  <.0001 60.0 78.6 18.6 <.0001 
Retained Earnings 342.8 506.0 163.2  <.0001 704.5 842.0 137.5 0.0040 
Cash 238.4 273.7 35.3 0.0001   1186.8 1207.4 20.6 0.8607 
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that the magnitude of the differences is much larger for the sample of financial 
firms.  During a recession, a typical non-financial firm experiences a 2.05 
percentage point reduction in quarterly profit margin, while the typical financial 
firms sees a 4.54 percentage point decrease.  We also show a significant increase in 
the debt ratio for financial firms; however the debt ratio for non-financial firms is 
not statistically different during a recession.  For financial firms the debt ratio 
tends to increase by roughly 1 percentage point during a recession.  This result is 
not surprising, but is of particular concern for financial institutions, which may 
have regulatory capital structure requirements.  As expected, other key financial 
ratios such as ROA, ROE, and market-to-book are all significantly lower during 
recessions for all firms. We would not necessarily expect raw financial variables 
such as total assets and net income to show significant deterioration during 
recessions, due to the long time dimension of our sample.     
The results of Table 1.2 provide some preliminary results showing a 
pronounced impact of a recession on financial sector firms. While both financial and 
non-financial firms experience a decline in profit margin, the decrease for financial 
firms is on average more than twice that of non-financial firms. We also find a 
significantly more pronounced decrease in ROA and a significantly pronounced 
increase in the debt ratio for financial firms.  
1.5.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
We now turn to a multivariate framework and attempt to more precisely 
measure the determinants of firm profitability and the effect of financial distress 
across firm types. Panels A and B of Table 1.3 present the results for the baseline 
model of firm profitability across the three decades in our sample. We divide the 
sample into decades in order to observe any changes in the responsiveness of firms 
to financial shocks over time. Table 1.3, Panel A presents the results for non-
financial firms, while Panel B presents the results for financial firms. Two 
alternative specifications are presented.  The dependent variable in all 
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specifications is profitability as defined by profit margin - total net income divided 
by total revenues.  We use the previously defined set of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors in each specification, but alternate the measures of 
macroeconomic distress. In specification (1), we include the recession dummy 
variable to measure macroeconomic stress, while the Financial Conditions Index is 
used in specification (2).  For each specification, we present the results of two 
estimation methods. The first method utilizes a panel OLS estimation with firm-
level fixed effects to account for cross-sectional variation among firms. These models 
can be applied to unbalanced panel data sets provided that the explanatory 
variables are strictly exogenous.  However, if this criterion is not met, it is possible 
that the estimated coefficients will not be consistent.  When applying an empirical 
model that relates firm performance to macroeconomic variables, it is possible that 
there is endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory variables. For 
example, it is possible that the state of the economy is influenced by firm 
performance. In this case, the endogeneity of the independent variables means that 
a more dynamic econometric methodology should be used. Additionally, if there is 
reason to believe that the dependent variable, profit margin, is highly persistent, 
then traditional static models become inappropriate as well. In order to ensure our 
estimates are robust to these issues, we also estimate the model of firm performance 
using a dynamic panel data approach in the style of Arellano and Bond (1991).  This 
model utilizes the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and uses differenced 
lagged dependent and state variables as instruments to derive consistent dynamic 
panel coefficient estimates.  Both static panel OLS and dynamic panel estimates are 
provided, along with panel-robust p-values. 
The results in Table 1.3 are consistent with previous studies with regards to 
the macroeconomic and firm-specific factors that influence firm profitability and 
stock performance.  For the non-financial sample, Inflation is significant and 
positive across almost all specifications. This is in contrast with the financial sector 
sample results, where Inflation is mostly insignificant in the 1980s and 1990s 
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samples, but positive in the 2000s sample.  A positive relationship between inflation 
and profit margin may be explained by the fact that inflation can be associated with 
times of high demand and good firm performance.  The dynamic panel estimate of 
the impact of the Federal funds rate on firm profitability is also significant and 
positive across decades for the sample of non-financial firms. However, we again 
only find a statistically significant relationship for financial firms in the 2000s 
sample.   A positive relationship between short-term interest rates and firm 
profitability can be explained by the contractionary monetary policy that is often 
implemented in response to recent positive economic performance.  Overall, the set 
of macroeconomic variables, Inflation, Real GDP Growth, FedFunds, and Spread 
are highly significant across all specifications for non-financial firms, while they 
only become consistently significant in the 2000s sample for financial firms.  The 
fact that the macroeconomic factors in our model are only consistently significant in 
the more recent sample indicates that financial firms may have become more 
influenced by macroeconomic forces since the year 2000. Furthermore, this is 
consistent with our a priori expectations, given associated changes in the regulatory 
framework and trends within the financial sector. 
  The results also highlight other potential differences between the financial 
and non-financial samples.  Debt Ratio exhibits a significantly negative and 
significant impact on firm profitability in all specifications for both financial and 
non-financial firms, as expected. Leverage increases fixed costs, thus reducing profit 
margin.  However, the impact on financial institutions appears to be larger. For 
example, in the 2000s sample, at the means, the dynamic panel estimate indicates 
that an increase in the debt ratio of a non-financial firm by 1 percentage point has 
the effect of reducing quarterly profit margin by about 0.25 percentage points, 
compared with a decrease of roughly 0.44 percentage points for financial firms.  The 
dynamic panel estimates also show a significant negative relationship between the 
current quarter’s profit margin and the change in the previous quarter’s profit 
margin, indicating that there is reversal in the time series. The difference between 
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the panel OLS and dynamic panel estimates of Profit Margin-1 can be explained by 
the fact that the lagged level is used in the panel OLS model, while that of the 
dynamic model is differenced.  The presence of the quarterly dummy variables also 
adds explanatory power to the model. 
The most important results presented in Table 1.3 measure the impact of the 
financial distress variables, Recession Dummy and Financial Condition on firm 
profitability.  We find, consistent with Table 1.2, that recessions and financial stress 
have a significant impact on the cross-section of firm profitability.  Both the 
Recession Dummy and Financial Condition coefficients are negative and significant 
in the 2000s for the dynamic panel estimations.  This is consistent with the a priori 
expectation that increasing financial stress causes a reduction in firm profit 
margins. In addition, the effects of financial stress appear to be more pronounced in 
the later sample periods, indicating that the sensitivity of firm profitability to 
financial stress has increased over time for all firms.  For example, the Recession 
Dummy coefficients are not significant for the non-financial firms in the 1980s and 
both the Recession Dummy and Financial Condition variables are insignificant in 
the 1980s for the financial firms. 
Table 1.3 also begins to show an increasing marginal sensitivity of financial 
firms to financial stress. For example, the dynamic panel estimate of the impact of a 
recession on non-financial firm profit margin for the 2000s sample is -0.82, 
compared with -1.1 for financial firms. Therefore, during a recession, we can expect 
the profit margin of a non-financial firm to decline by 0.8 percentage points, while 
that of a financial firm will decline by more than one percentage point.  In addition, 
the coefficient estimating of the impact of Financial Condition on non-financial 
performance is -0.47, compared with -1.8 for financial firms.  These results point to 
the fact that financial firms react more to changes in financial stress, and this 
sensitivity is pronounced in the later sample period.  While we may expect that 
financial firms are more affected by the factors included in the Financial Conditions 
Index, the intended function of many financial regulations and the goals of 
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Table 1.3: The Impact of Financial Stress on Real Sector and Financial Firm Profit Margin 
Multiple regression estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on firm 
profitability, as defined by net income divided by total revenue (profit margin).  The panel OLS 
coefficients are measured using firm-level, cross-sectional fixed-effects, and panel robust standard 
errors are used to compute p-values.  Dynamic panel estimates are measured using a dynamic GMM 
estimation procedure along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991). Panel robust standard errors are 
used to compute standard errors.  P-values are reported below each coefficient.  
1980s 
Panel A: Non-Financial Firms Panel B: Financial Firms 
Panel OLS Dynamic Panel Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 0.302 0.312 0.205 0.256 -0.167 -0.157 -0.078 -0.036 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.378 0.410 0.731 0.874 
Real GDP Growth 0.021 0.035 -0.046 -0.049 -0.186 -0.194 0.188 0.096 
0.382 0.062 0.113 0.143 0.173 0.069 0.108 0.478 
Fed Funds Rate 0.211 0.223 0.450 0.555 0.049 0.058 0.058 0.079 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.471 0.375 0.747 0.688 
Recession Dummy -0.101 0.040 0.006 0.484 
0.142 0.719 0.988 0.411 
Financial Condition -0.134 -0.353 -0.072 -0.113 
0.000 0.000 0.603 0.590 
Total Assets -0.498 -0.476 -3.321 -3.208 -0.260 -0.255 -0.988 -1.197 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.266 0.276 0.225 0.146 
Debt Ratio -0.081 -0.081 -0.105 -0.106 -0.253 -0.253 -0.178 -0.177 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.002 0.002 -0.366 -0.367 0.001 0.001 -0.396 -0.396 
0.009 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.213 0.000 0.000 
Spread 0.236 0.253 0.403 0.507 0.412 0.426 0.353 0.385 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.107 
Q2 Dummy 0.232 0.262 0.191 0.273 -0.342 -0.324 0.129 0.183 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.172 0.437 0.275 
Q3 Dummy 0.216 0.252 0.279 0.401 -0.552 -0.531 -0.271 -0.196 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.026 0.228 0.391 
Q4 Dummy -0.015 0.023 -0.170 -0.022 -0.973 -0.948 -0.932 -0.834 
0.780 0.675 0.004 0.725 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Firms 7,042 7,042 6,609 6,609 761 761 714 714 
Obs. 152,945 152,945 127,248 127,248   14,370 14,370 11,532 11,532 
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Table 1.3 (cont.): The Impact of Financial Stress on Real Sector and Financial Firm Profit Margin  
  1990s 
  Panel A: Non-Financial Firms   Panel B: Financial Firms   
Panel OLS 
Dynami
c Panel Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 0.468 0.017 0.591 0.156 -0.093 -0.639 0.056 -0.081 
0.000 0.865 0.000 0.137 0.788 0.072 0.877 0.819 
Real GDP 
Growth -0.283 0.231 -0.704 -0.004 -0.454 0.128 -0.633 -0.297 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.038 0.535 0.007 0.184 
Fed Funds Rate 0.412 0.309 1.191 1.377 -0.102 -0.215 0.035 0.216 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.394 0.066 0.868 0.322 
Recession 
Dummy -1.239 -0.074 -1.357 0.284 
0.000 0.516 0.004 0.489 
Financial 
Condition -0.630 -3.194 -0.826 -2.142 
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Total Assets -0.907 -0.846 -2.910 -1.374 0.346 0.442 -2.747 -1.621 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.135 0.068 0.000 0.032 
Debt Ratio -0.082 -0.082 -0.151 -0.153 -0.237 -0.237 -0.265 -0.270 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.001 0.001 -0.375 -0.377 0.003 0.003 -0.404 -0.404 
0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.109 0.000 0.000 
Spread 0.534 0.335 1.194 1.025 -0.127 -0.368 0.347 0.314 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348 0.009 0.131 0.171 
Q2 Dummy 0.405 0.404 0.651 0.674 -0.054 -0.060 0.697 0.697 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.804 0.782 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.590 0.580 0.859 1.063 -0.495 -0.489 0.299 0.427 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.019 0.162 0.049 
Q4 Dummy -0.144 -0.056 -0.131 0.763 -1.385 -1.258 -1.040 -0.444 
0.033 0.418 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068 
No. of Firms 10,773 10,773 9,811 9,811 1,411 1,411 1,317 1,317 
Obs. 224,737 224,737 182,709 182,709   28,997 28,997 23,830 23,830 
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Table 1.3 (cont.): The Impact of Financial Stress on Real Sector and Financial Firm Profit Margin  
  2000s 
Panel A: Non-Financial Firms Panel B: Financial Firms 
Panel OLS Dynamic Panel Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 1.071 1.121 0.443 0.305 0.682 0.244 1.134 0.580 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.332 0.000 0.012 
Real GDP Growth 0.514 1.895 0.230 0.276 1.991 2.474 1.310 1.040 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate -2.810 -2.818 1.362 1.740 -0.354 -0.344 3.008 3.704 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.110 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy -3.662 -0.819 -4.028 -1.061 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.066 
Financial Condition 0.106 -0.473 -1.962 -1.763 
0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total Assets -1.358 -1.432 0.719 0.547 0.226 0.632 -3.701 -3.911 
0.000 0.000 0.164 0.290 0.469 0.045 0.008 0.005 
Debt Ratio -0.018 -0.019 -0.253 -0.253 -0.199 -0.200 -0.442 -0.436 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.000 0.000 -0.338 -0.338 0.000 0.000 -0.395 -0.398 
0.063 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.281 0.288 0.000 0.000 
Spread -3.646 -3.738 0.230 0.564 -0.707 -0.960 1.940 2.425 
0.000 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Q2 Dummy 1.406 0.540 0.813 0.633 -0.328 -0.851 0.188 0.084 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.254 0.003 0.439 0.702 
Q3 Dummy 0.772 0.598 1.013 0.965 -1.519 -1.571 -0.925 -0.906 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Q4 Dummy -0.434 -0.530 -0.211 -0.197 -1.847 -1.797 -1.328 -1.224 
0.000 0.000 0.013 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Firms 9,520 9,520 8,956 8,956 1,323 1,323 1,257 1,257 
Obs. 229,906 229,906 192,629 192,629 32,775 32,775 27,753 27,753 
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innovative financial products like swaps are to immunize financial firms from many 
of these risks.   
In the previous analyses, we compare the determinants of firm profitability of 
financial and non-financial firms by comparing the results of regressions performed 
on separate samples.  A more robust analysis is one that allows for a more direct 
statistical comparison. Accordingly, we present a nested model, whereby we test the 
impact of the financial distress measures on financial companies with the use of 
dummy variables and associated interaction terms. We create a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the firm is a financial firm, defined by SIC code, and interact 
this variable with the financial distress variables.  This allows us to analyze the 
marginal impact of the financial distress variables on financial companies over time 
without the need to compare coefficients from different samples. Table 1.4 presents 
the results for the two specifications of firm profitability defined previously. There 
is an added set of interaction terms that test the relationship between financial 
firms and financial stress.  For example, the variable Financial*Recession measures 
the marginal impact of a recession on the profitability of financial firms.  
The results of Table 1.4 are consistent with those of Table 1.3. For example, 
the coefficients of Debt Ratio, Profit Margin-1 and Total Assets remain negative.  
Likewise, the coefficients for Inflation, FedFunds Rate, and Spread remain positive.  
The results of Table 1.4 also coincide with previous results suggesting financial 
firms have become increasingly more affected by financial distress.  The significant 
negative coefficients for Financial*Recession and Financial*Condition in the 2000s 
sample imply that financial firms experience a greater decrease in profit margin as 
a result of financial distress, compared with non-financial firms.  The results from 
the dynamic panel estimation for the most recent sample imply that a recession will 
cause the profit margin of a financial firm to fall by approximately 1.2 percentage 
points more than that of a non-financial firm.  An analogous argument holds for an 
increase in the Financial Conditions Index. An increase in the Financial Conditions 
Index of one (which is a large movement), results in the profit margin of financial 
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firms decreasing by 1.1 percentage points more than that of the average non-
financial firm.  In addition, there is also evidence that this sensitivity has increased 
over time. For example, in the 1980s sample, Financial*Recession is positive at 1.2 
and Financial*Condition is insignificant. In the 1990s sample, the positive 
coefficient Financial*Recession falls to 0.82, while Financial*Condition becomes 
negative and significant. Finally, in the 2000s sample, both financial distress 
interaction terms become negative and significant. This implies that, during the 
1980s, financial firms had profit margins that were 1.2 percentage points higher 
than non-financial firms as a result of a recession, and there was no difference 
between the performance of financial and non-financial firms as a result of a change 
in the Financial Conditions Index.  However, by the 2000s, financial firm margins 
were 1.2 percentage points worse than those of non-financial firms as a result of a 
recession, and financial firms performed worse than non-financial firms as a result 
of changes in the Financial Conditions Index as well. 
1.6 Stock Return Effect 
In this section, as a robustness check, we utilize the panel data regression 
framework to analyze the impact of financial distress on the cross-section of stock 
returns.  We begin by applying the multivariable regression model used in Section 
1.5 to the cross section of stock returns. The dependent variable in this framework 
is the total monthly excess stock return.  The independent variables remain the 
same set of firm-specific and macroeconomic variables used in Section 1.5, but 
lagged profit margin is replaced by the lagged monthly excess return, and real GDP 
growth is replaced by the CRSP equal weighted market return.  It is likely that 
investors are able to quickly anticipate changes in true firm fundamentals, and they 
also have horizons beyond the current quarterly results. Thus, the a priori 
expectation is that the impact of the distress variables on firm performance as 
measured by stock returns will be diluted significantly. 
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Table 1.4: The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Financial Sector Profit Margin 
Multiple regression estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on 
firm profitability, as defined by net income divided by total revenue (profit margin).  The panel 
OLS coefficients are measured using firm-level, cross-sectional fixed-effects, and panel robust 
standard errors are used to compute p-values.  Dynamic panel estimates are measured using a 
dynamic GMM estimation procedure along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991). Panel robust 
standard errors are used to compute standard errors.  P-values are reported below each 
coefficient.  
  1980s 
  Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 0.2698 0.2810 0.1808 0.2331 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Real GDP Growth 0.0060 0.0228 -0.0132 -0.0143 
0.808 0.233 0.633 0.667 
Fed Funds Rate 0.1916 0.2000 0.4032 0.4911 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy -0.0580  
-0.0809 
 
0.405 
 
0.463 
 
Financial Condition  
-0.1037 
 
-0.3258 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Total Assets -0.5442 -0.5228 -2.4873 -2.4277 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Debt Ratio -0.0926 -0.0926 -0.1146 -0.1151 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.0022 0.0022 -0.3758 -0.3766 
0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Spread 0.2392 0.2536 0.4252 0.5080 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial*Recession -0.7819  
1.2208 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
Financial*Condition  
-0.2262 
 
-0.0316 
 
0.068 
 
0.804 
Q2 Dummy 0.1843 0.2108 0.1873 0.2645 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.1542 0.1847 0.2239 0.3363 
0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Q4 Dummy -0.0965 -0.0639 -0.2454 -0.1082 
0.075 0.241 0.000 0.071 
    
No. of Firms 7,803 7,803 7,323 7,323 
Obs. 167,315 167,315 138,780 138,780 
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Table 1.4 (cont.): The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Financial Sector Profit Margin  
  1990s 
  Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 0.3963 -0.0564 0.5516 0.1355 
0.000 0.557 0.000 0.180 
Real GDP Growth -0.2987 0.2133 -0.7085 -0.0622 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.324 
Fed Funds Rate 0.3496 0.2443 1.0120 1.1963 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy -1.0888 -0.1373 
0.000 0.210 
Financial Condition -0.7362 -2.5114 
0.000 0.000 
Total Assets -0.8100 -0.7587 -2.8565 -1.3621 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Debt Ratio -0.0952 -0.0950 -0.1651 -0.1672 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.0011 0.0011 -0.3838 -0.3862 
0.019 0.019 0.000 0.000 
Spread 0.4435 0.2425 1.0865 0.9351 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial*Recession -1.4873 0.8189 
0.000 0.014 
Financial*Condition 0.9601 -3.9096 
0.000 0.000 
Q2 Dummy 0.3522 0.3506 0.6631 0.6823 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.4663 0.4579 0.8039 0.9915 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q4 Dummy -0.2889 -0.2028 -0.2268 0.6021 
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 
No. of Firms 12,184 12,184 11,128 11,128 
Obs.   253,734 253,734 206,539 206,539   
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Table 1.4: The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Financial Sector Profit Margin 
  2000s 
  Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 1.0297 1.0149 0.5230 0.3288 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Real GDP Growth 0.6982 1.9759 0.3295 0.3319 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate -2.5596 -2.5646 1.5896 2.0087 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy -3.3963 -0.6647 
0.000 0.000 
Financial Condition 0.1449 -0.5070 
0.037 0.000 
Total Assets -1.3219 -1.3193 -0.1861 -0.3716 
0.000 0.000 0.699 0.441 
Debt Ratio -0.0322 -0.0324 -0.2734 -0.2724 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 0.0001 0.0001 -0.3503 -0.3506 
0.031 0.030 0.000 0.000 
Spread -3.3501 -3.4629 0.4582 0.8135 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial*Recession -2.6886 -1.2293 
0.000 0.009 
Financial*Condition -2.3992 -1.0702 
0.000 0.000 
Q2 Dummy 1.1937 0.3678 0.7215 0.5543 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.4846 0.3277 0.7668 0.7269 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Q4 Dummy -0.6213 -0.6984 -0.3452 -0.3195 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Firms 10,843 10,843 10,213 10,213 
Obs.   262,681 262,681 220,382 220,382 
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To compare the effect of financial distress on the stock returns of financial 
and non-financial firms, we again divide the sample into financial and non-financial 
firm samples based on SIC code. We run the firm performance specifications from 
the previous section on the financial and non-financial samples and utilize a firm-
level fixed-effect panel OLS estimation procedure.  The longer time series nature of 
the monthly stock returns reduces the need to employ the dynamic panel estimates 
used in the previous section.  Results for the stock performance regressions are 
presented in Table 1.5.  
The results show that the larger magnitude of the impact of the distress 
variables on financial firms is echoed in the cross-section of stock returns.  The 
Financial Condition and the Recession Dummy coefficient estimates are negative 
and significant at the five percent level in all specifications for both financial and 
non-financial firms in the 2000s sample.  The macroeconomic stress variables that 
have caused an increasingly large reduction in profit margin also negatively impact 
the stock returns of firms as well.  In addition, there is evidence supporting an 
increasing sensitivity of financial sector stock returns to financial distress.  The 
coefficient estimates for the 2000s sample show that a recession is associated with a 
-0.01 percentage point decrease in excess monthly return for financial stocks, but 
there is only a -0.001 percentage point decrease in excess monthly return for non-
financial stocks.  The Financial Conditions Index shows a similar result, with a 
Financial Condition coefficient of -0.006 for financial firms, compared with -0.003 
for non-financial firms. 
For a more direct comparison of the effects of financial distress, we again 
apply the nested model with the financial dummy variable interaction terms.  The 
results are presented in Table 1.6. We find results that are less consistent with the 
results presented in Section 1.5; however there is still a marginal difference with 
regards to the impact of financial distress on financial firm stock returns. The signs 
of Financial*Recession and Financial*Condition are positive in the 1980s sample, 
but Financial*Financial Condition turns negative in the 1990s sample, while 
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Table 1.5: The Impact of Financial Stress on Stock Returns         
Panel-OLS estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on firm stock 
return.  The panel OLS coefficients are measured using firm-level, cross-sectional fixed-effects, and 
panel robust standard errors are used to compute p-values. P-values are reported below each coefficient.  
Non-Financial Firms 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
Variable (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Returnt-1 -0.05908 -0.05868 -0.04549 -0.04556 -0.04075 -0.04125 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Return 0.95518 0.95886 0.94435 0.94345 0.95454 0.95001 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate 0.00005 0.00010 0.00205 0.00179 0.00145 0.00101 
0.657 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Spread -0.00001 0.00003 0.00201 0.00157 0.00193 0.00115 
0.965 0.866 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 
Inflation -0.00643 -0.00644 -0.00215 -0.00260 0.00258 0.00174 
0.000 0.000 0.135 0.075 0.000 0.009 
Recession Dummy 0.00221 -0.00019 -0.00124 
0.000 0.833 0.033 
Financial Condition 0.00087 -0.00105 -0.00324 
0.000 0.027 0.000 
Total Assets 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.411 0.327 0.108 0.137 0.004 0.020 
Debt Ratio -0.00448 -0.00450 0.00350 0.00372 0.02149 0.02227 
0.059 0.058 0.109 0.088 0.000 0.000 
Q2 Dummy 0.00459 0.00448 0.00483 0.00498 0.00469 0.00458 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.00352 0.00344 0.00288 0.00301 0.00162 0.00134 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.017 
Q4 Dummy 0.00508 0.00499 0.00583 0.00614 0.00615 0.00617 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Firms 396,643 396,643 9,380 9,380 7,645 7,645 
N 6,480 6,480   548,702 548,702   511,300 511,300 
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Table 1.5 (cont.): The Impact of Financial Stress on Stock Returns       
Financial Firms 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
Variable (1) (2)   (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Returnt-1 -0.05584 -0.05656 -0.06330 -0.06628 -0.04230 -0.04302 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Return 0.86165 0.85993 0.70658 0.69761 0.66660 0.66373 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate 0.00207 0.00244 0.00123 -0.00092 -0.00025 0.00000 
0.000 0.000 0.035 0.114 0.713 0.996 
Spread 0.00148 0.00174 0.00257 -0.00261 -0.00119 -0.00139 
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.119 
Inflation -0.01165 -0.01179 -0.02753 -0.03248 -0.00571 -0.00603 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy 0.00262 0.01054 -0.01008 
0.186 0.000 0.000 
Financial Condition -0.00114 -0.01492 -0.00555 
0.178 0.000 0.000 
Total Assets 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.357 0.353 0.872 0.066 0.015 0.035 
Debt Ratio 0.00531 0.00548 -0.00545 -0.00265 -0.01285 -0.01164 
0.405 0.389 0.327 0.629 0.040 0.060 
Q2 Dummy 0.00089 0.00116 0.00195 0.00292 0.01107 0.01007 
0.588 0.480 0.105 0.016 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.00261 0.00291 0.00090 0.00233 0.01354 0.01326 
0.096 0.066 0.455 0.055 0.000 0.000 
Q4 Dummy 0.00508 0.00549 0.00205 0.00675 0.00624 0.00701 
0.004 0.002 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Firms 676 676 1,208 1,208 1,030 1,030 
N 34,675 34,675   68,761 68,761   71,302 71,302 
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Financial*Recession becomes negative in the 2000s sample.  This supports the 
results of Section 1.5 that show financial stress has had an increasingly negative 
impact on the performance of financial firms. However, the Financial*Condition 
coefficient is positive and significant for the 2000s sample. As expected, the signs 
and magnitude of the stock return estimation imply that stock prices are efficient 
enough to remove much of the impact of macroeconomic news when sampled at the 
frequency under consideration. The economic significance of the distress variables 
as well as the financial interaction terms in explaining stock returns is fairly small, 
when compared with their impact on quarterly profit margin. 
1.7 Further Analysis of the Finance Industry 
It is shown in previous sections that there is evidence supporting the idea 
that financial sector companies are more affected by changes in key financial 
distress variables than their real sector counterparts, and this result has many 
important governance implications.  Expanding upon these results, we compare the 
impact of financial distress across sub-industries within the financial sector, as this 
is an important factor in identifying the potential sources of the increased 
susceptibility of the financial sector to economic distress.  As a final analysis of the 
impact of financial distress on financial firms, we provide a more detailed analysis 
of the financial services industry. We begin by dividing the sample of financial firms 
into six sub-industries based on SIC code: depository institutions, finance 
companies, financial services, insurance, real estate, and investment companies.  
Table 1.7 presents the descriptive statistics for these subsamples of financial firms.  
Depository institutions have the highest average total assets with an average 
of $63.0 billion, and they also have the highest average revenues and net income per 
quarter at $1.1 billion and $116.0 million, respectively.  For the average financial 
firm, profit margins are 7.7 percent for depository institutions, 11.6 percent for 
finance companies, 7.4 percent for financial services firms, 7.8 percent for insurance 
companies, 4.6 percent for real estate companies and 18.9 percent for investment 
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Table 1.6: The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Financial Sector Stock Returns 
Panel-OLS estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on firm stock return.  The 
panel OLS coefficients are measured using firm-level, cross-sectional fixed-effects, and panel robust standard 
errors are used to compute p-values. P-values are reported below each coefficient. 
  1980s   1990s   2000s 
Variable (1) (2)   (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Returnt-1 -0.05879 -0.05843 -0.04653 -0.04677 -0.04054 -0.04107 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Market Return 0.94753 0.95079 0.91753 0.91571 0.92007 0.91569 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds Rate 0.00019 0.00026 0.00201 0.00152 0.00132 0.00094 
0.054 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Spread 0.00010 0.00014 0.00212 0.00113 0.00164 0.00090 
0.462 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 
Inflation -0.00683 -0.00688 -0.00514 -0.00610 0.00152 0.00076 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.188 
Recession Dummy 0.00190 0.00039 -0.00194 
0.001 0.689 0.001 
Financial Condition 0.00061 -0.00189 -0.00375 
0.010 0.000 0.000 
Total Assets 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
0.655 0.399 0.475 0.520 0.003 0.007 
Debt Ratio -0.00359 -0.00349 0.00246 0.00294 0.01849 0.01924 
0.091 0.100 0.200 0.126 0.000 0.000 
Q2 Dummy 0.00431 0.00424 0.00447 0.00471 0.00546 0.00523 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 Dummy 0.00346 0.00342 0.00264 0.00291 0.00305 0.00275 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q4 Dummy 0.00513 0.00509 0.00540 0.00621 0.00616 0.00625 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial*Recession 0.00510 0.00544 -0.00292 
0.005 0.030 0.040 
Financial*Financial Condition 0.00140 -0.00668 0.00184 
0.054 0.000 0.012 
No. of Firms 7,152 7,152 10,588 10,588 8,672 8,672 
Obs. 431,318 431,318   617,463 617,463   582,602 582,602 
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firms.  Financial service firms have the highest average ROA and ROE at 1.2 and 
3.4 percent, respectively.  Investment firms have the lowest average debt ratio of 
52.2 percent, while finance companies have the highest at 76.7 percent. 
We continue the analysis of financial firms by applying the firm profitability 
model presented in section 1.5 to the subsample of financial firms. The Dynamic 
panel coefficients are estimated from the 2000s sample of financial firms, and the 
results are reported in Table 1.8. We focus on the later sample of firms due to the 
fact that the negative impact of financial stress on the financial sector is most 
pronounced in the latest sample. In addition, the effect of financial stress on 
financial firms in the most recent sample is the most relevant for making current 
governance and policy decisions.  
The model describing the profitability across financial sector sub-groups 
behaves similarly to that of the full sample of financial firms.  Inflation, Real GDP 
Growth, FedFunds Rate, and Spread are consistently positive and significant, while 
Total Assets, Debt Ratio, and Profit Margin-1 have a consistent negative impact on 
profit margin.  However, the major result of this analysis is that both the Financial 
Condition and Recession Dummy coefficients are insignificant for depository 
institutions.  This implies that the pronounced effects of these variables on financial 
firm profitability and stock returns is likely driven by the non-depository sectors of 
the financial industry, or the “shadow” banking system.  Conversely, for the 
remainder of the industries, at least one of the financial distress variables is 
negative and significant at the five percent level. For the financial services sub-
industry, both Recession Dummy and Financial Condition are negative and 
significant at the five percent level.  Non-depository financial institutions appear to 
be particularly sensitive to changes in the Financial Conditions Index, with all 
coefficients for Financial Condition being negative and significant at the five 
percent level, except for the real estate sub-sector, where it is only marginally 
significant (p-value=0.124).  Table 1.8 suggests that the most sensitive sector to 
financial distress is financial services.  An economic recession is associated with a 
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.7: Financial firm Summary Statistics 
The following are descriptive statistics on a sample of COMPUSTAT 
Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), sampled quarterly from 1980Q1 
through 2010Q4. The data includes all firms with revenues of more 
than$ 500K and is windsorized in each tail at the one percentile. The 
sample also requires each firm to have at least 8 quarters of complete 
data. 
All Financial Firms 
    
Full 
sample 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Total Assets 
Mean 16,215 3,156 7,774 29,408 
Std. Dev. 95,149 10,949 32,735 140,429 
Revenue 
Mean 487 200 289 787 
Std. Dev. 1,963 632 976 2,788 
Net Income 
Mean 36 11 23 59 
Std. Dev. 243 33 90 359 
Profit Margin 
(%) 
Mean 11.20 11.55 11.41 10.86 
Std. Dev. 21.84 17.00 19.05 25.70 
ROA (%) 
Mean 0.84 1.01 0.85 0.76 
Std. Dev. 2.02 1.75 1.87 2.24 
ROE (%) 
Mean 2.70 3.31 2.73 2.41 
Std. Dev. 6.83 6.19 6.17 7.59 
Debt Ratio (%) 
Mean 63.78 64.98 63.50 63.50 
Std. Dev. 26.50 25.33 27.26 26.30 
Market Cap 
Mean 2,087 406 1,133 3,511 
Std. Dev. 9,273 1,063 4,872 12,867 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Mean 1.30 0.95 1.00 1.30 
Std. Dev. 1.01 0.01 0.01 1.01 
Capital Expenditures 
Mean 63 16 50 88 
Std. Dev. 642 116 597 765 
Retained Earnings 
Mean 722 218 401 1,218 
Std. Dev. 3,981 584 1,561 5,807 
Cash 
Mean 1,195 26 - 1,196 
  Std. Dev. 5,775 31 - 5,777 
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Table 1.7 (cont.): Financial firm Summary Statistics 
SIC Industry  
    Depository Finance Services Insurance Real Estate Investment 
Total Assets 
Mean 63,040 28,891 34,375 18,863 751 1,455 
Std. Dev. 126,855 141,061 153,460 93,147 3,375 3,455 
Revenue 
Mean 1,109 738 687 807 54 70 
Std. Dev. 1,885 2,709 2,459 2,456 195 277 
Net Income 
Mean 116 64 51 49 3 8 
Std. Dev. 259 412 323 248 24 29 
Profit Margin (%) 
Mean 7.67 11.55 7.39 7.76 4.62 18.85 
Std. Dev. 15.20 19.05 18.13 15.07 21.41 27.92 
ROA (%) 
Mean 0.66 0.60 1.18 0.82 0.63 0.94 
Std. Dev. 2.29 1.42 3.06 1.70 2.15 1.90 
ROE (%) 
Mean 3.32 3.18 3.36 3.03 2.05 2.06 
Std. Dev. 7.90 6.19 7.65 6.51 8.44 6.18 
Debt Ratio (%) 
Mean 71.32 76.74 59.77 70.61 61.79 52.24 
Std. Dev. 29.44 22.11 29.35 20.83 27.53 26.38 
Market Cap 
Mean 6,665 3,637 3,067 2,779 317 755 
Std. Dev. 13,410 18,702 10,123 9,674 1,192 1,649 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Mean 1.44 1.06 1.71 1.07 1.19 1.37 
Std. Dev. 0.87 0.36 1.48 0.44 0.51 1.23 
Capital Expenditures 
Mean 50 317 36 26 23 6 
Std. Dev. 115 1,625 148 255 180 51 
Retained Earnings 
Mean 1,862 1,350 1,056 1,167 49 -65 
Std. Dev. 3,792 7,298 4,364 3,907 418 255 
Cash 
Mean 5,348 2,926 2,005 1,212 70 105 
  Std. Dev. 16,338 8,896 7,819 3,819 210 319 
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2.5 percentage point drop in profit margin for financial services companies.  The 
percentage point decrease in profit margin associated with a recession for insurance 
companies is likewise 3.7 percent; however the Financial Condition coefficient is not 
significant for insurance companies.  The results suggest that the pronounced 
impact of financial distress on financial firms is likely driven by non-depository 
institutions like financial services, finance companies, real estate, insurance, and 
investment firms.   
Following the framework presented in previous sections, we continue our 
analysis of financial companies by directly comparing the determinants of financial 
sector profits across sub-sectors using a nested model framework.  We begin by 
constructing several dummy variables that represent each sub-sector within the 
financial industry: Depository, Finance, Insurance, Investment, Real Estate, and 
Services. We then use the sub-sector dummies to create an interaction term with 
the financial distress variables.  In this estimation, non-financial firms are the 
baseline firm, and the interaction terms describe the marginal impact of the 
financial distress measures on the average firm in each sub-sector. For example, 
Deposit*Recession represents the marginal impact of a recession on the profit 
margin of a depository institution, compared with that of a non-financial firm.  The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 1.9. 
The conclusion that the recent financial sector sensitivity to macroeconomic 
distress is driven by non-depository institutions is supported by the results reported 
in Table 1.9. The dynamic panel estimate of the impact of a recession on the 
performance of depository institutions, Deposit*Recession, is insignificant in the 
2000s sample, and the panel OLS estimate is positive and significant.  Additionally, 
both the dynamic and panel OLS estimates are positive and significant for the 
1980s sample.  Additionally, dynamic estimates for Deposit*Condition are 
insignificant across the samples, while the panel OLS estimates are positive and  
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Table 1.8: The Impact of Financial Stress on Profit Margin across Financial Institutions 
Multiple regression estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on 
firm profitability, as defined by net income divided by total revenue (profit margin). The 
estimates are dynamic panel estimates measured using a dynamic GMM estimation procedure 
along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991). Panel robust standard errors are used to compute 
standard errors.  P-values are reported below each coefficient.  
  Depository Finance Services 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation -0.5364 -0.7756 1.4034 0.6198 1.5047 0.6244 
0.572 0.332 0.041 0.365 0.011 0.302 
Real GDP 
Growth -0.1508 -1.0603 1.6272 1.1740 2.6781 2.3008 
0.884 0.385 0.023 0.109 0.000 0.000 
Fed Funds 
Rate 2.3484 2.2144 3.4670 4.2591 3.5001 4.6702 
0.186 0.172 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Recession 
Dummy 2.6919 -1.1321 -2.5314 
0.362 0.478 0.022 
Financial Condition -0.8470 -2.7281 -2.9424 
0.523 0.019 0.000 
Total Assets -8.0372 -8.0627 -6.7314 -7.0306 1.6993 1.4442 
0.137 0.114 0.161 0.141 0.429 0.495 
Debt Ratio -0.4197 -0.4019 -0.3428 -0.3182 -0.1722 -0.1639 
0.028 0.031 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.024 
Profit 
Margin-1 -0.2055 -0.2086 -0.3087 -0.3128 -0.3542 -0.3587 
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spread 3.1713 3.1438 3.7923 4.3385 2.4067 3.2104 
0.109 0.083 0.016 0.005 0.014 0.001 
Q2 Dummy -1.2646 -0.7726 -0.5360 -0.6032 -0.5883 -0.7740 
0.276 0.448 0.443 0.359 0.238 0.113 
Q3 Dummy 0.1186 0.2275 -1.2852 -1.2498 -0.9155 -0.7555 
0.871 0.740 0.087 0.099 0.100 0.180 
Q4 Dummy -2.1630 -2.1306 -1.7010 -1.5316 -0.5123 -0.1600 
0.022 0.021 0.009 0.017 0.331 0.753 
No. of Firms 38 38 154 154 175 175 
Obs. 887 887 3,384 3,384 3,629 3,629 
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Table 1.8 (cont.): The Impact of Financial Stress on Profit Margin across Financial 
Institutions 
  Insurance Real Estate Investment 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Inflation 0.0499 -0.0410 2.6463 2.2278 1.3909 0.5929 
0.854 0.897 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.207 
Real GDP Growth 1.6002 1.9864 1.3301 1.3364 0.6691 -0.0012 
0.000 0.000 0.080 0.105 0.103 0.998 
Fed Funds Rate 0.2332 1.2102 1.6954 2.6555 4.0697 4.3965 
0.686 0.025 0.251 0.053 0.000 0.000 
Recession Dummy -3.7394 -2.2287 1.2249 
0.000 0.302 0.342 
Financial Condition -0.3352 -1.3670 -2.3422 
0.544 0.124 0.000 
Total Assets -7.7831 -7.9803 4.0868 3.6601 -9.0099 -8.8876 
0.004 0.005 0.344 0.394 0.001 0.001 
Debt Ratio -0.6611 -0.6803 -0.6611 -0.6560 -0.5831 -0.5674 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Profit Margin-1 -0.3127 -0.3115 -0.3689 -0.3696 -0.4101 -0.4126 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spread -0.4930 0.1881 0.6755 1.3763 2.4745 2.7202 
0.429 0.750 0.667 0.359 0.003 0.001 
Q2 Dummy 0.6687 0.0384 0.8904 0.4777 0.1325 0.4415 
0.025 0.888 0.336 0.569 0.809 0.359 
Q3 Dummy -2.0985 -2.2754 0.4356 0.2985 -0.3583 -0.1969 
0.000 0.000 0.728 0.810 0.554 0.742 
Q4 Dummy -2.2929 -2.3400 1.0150 1.0437 -1.3323 -1.1867 
0.000 0.000 0.424 0.412 0.006 0.014 
No. of Firms 332 332 136 136 422 422 
Obs. 8,291 8,291 2,668 2,668 8,894 8,894 
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significant for the later samples. The insignificant interaction terms for the 
dynamic estimates in the later samples means that from 2000 to 2010, the 
performance response from depository institutions to a recession or change in the 
Financial Conditions Index is no different than that of an average non-financial 
firm. This result supports the efficacy of regulations and internal controls aimed at 
controlling risk within depository institutions. At least one of the dynamic panel 
and many of the panel OLS interaction term estimates are negative and significant 
for all other non-depository institutions in the most recent sample, indicating that 
these firms have greater sensitivity to financial distress than the average non-
financial firm. In addition, consistent with the results of Table 1.8, both 
Services*Recession and Services*Condition are negative and significant, implying 
that financial service firms are the most sensitive to economic distress, having a 
decrease in profit margin of almost three percentage points more than the average 
non-financial firm during a recession.  The relatively high risks of the financial 
services sub-sector is feasible given that this sub-sector also yields the highest 
average ROE and ROA.  For the other non-depository sub-sectors, the dynamic 
estimates for the 2000s sample report a negative and significant recession 
interaction term for insurance and real estate companies, while the Financial 
Conditions Index interaction term is negative and significant for finance and 
investment companies. In addition, many of the interaction terms weaken in 
economic significance or change signs in the two earlier samples, indicating that the 
sensitivity of these firms to economic distress has increased over time. This finding 
is consistent with the heightened risks associated with the increased use of 
financial products that expose non-depository financial intermediaries to greater 
systemic risk.        
The results of a nested model that examines the marginal effect of financial 
stress on different types of financial institutions mirror the findings from Table 1.8 
that non-depository firms drive the pronounced impact of economic stress on 
financial firm profit margins found in sections 1.5 and 1.6.  This result is expected 
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Table 1.9: The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Profit Margin 
across Financial Firms 
Multiple regression estimates of the effect of a set of macroeconomic and 
firm-specific factors on firm profitability, as defined by net income 
divided by total revenue (profit margin).  The panel OLS coefficients are 
measured using firm-level, cross-sectional fixed-effects, and panel 
robust standard errors are used to compute p-values.  Dynamic panel 
estimates are measured using a dynamic GMM estimation procedure 
along the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991). Panel robust standard 
errors are used to compute standard errors.  P-values are reported 
below each coefficient. 
 
1980s 
 
Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Deposit*Recession 3.8111 3.5128 
0.055 0.087 
Deposit*Condition 0.7298 -0.5389 
0.441 0.470 
Finance*Recession -0.8244 2.5137 
0.013 0.000 
Finance*Condition -0.6120 -0.1757 
0.000 0.418 
Insurance*Recession -1.0713 -1.0699 
0.001 0.017 
Insurance*Condition -0.5621 -0.5816 
0.000 0.000 
Investment*Recession -3.3813 2.3201 
0.000 0.039 
Investment*Condition -0.0600 0.7578 
0.870 0.037 
RealEstate*Recession 1.9276 1.5659 
0.005 0.122 
RealEstate*Condition 0.6203 0.3678 
0.072 0.327 
Services*Recession 0.5689 1.0876 
0.252 0.190 
Services*Condition -0.5019 -0.4877 
0.051 0.078 
Control Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Firms 7,803 7,803 7,323 7,323 
Obs. 167,315 167,315 138,780 138,780 
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Table 1.9 (cont.): The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Profit Margin 
across Financial Firms  
1990s 
Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Deposit*Recession 0.5824 1.4891 
0.762 0.433 
Deposit*Condition 4.1204 0.0964 
0.000 0.951 
Finance*Recession -1.7174 1.4369 
0.003 0.010 
Finance*Condition -0.0166 -4.9673 
0.969 0.000 
Insurance*Recession -1.3163 0.9046 
0.002 0.018 
Insurance*Condition 0.3637 -2.8033 
0.120 0.000 
Investment*Recession -0.7738 1.6122 
0.430 0.095 
Investment*Condition 1.4421 -6.5409 
0.001 0.000 
RealEstate*Recession -2.4265 -1.8232 
0.069 0.092 
RealEstate*Condition 3.0341 -1.7208 
0.000 0.194 
Services*Recession -2.4955 0.1151 
0.000 0.861 
Services*Condition 0.0458 -1.7383 
0.906 0.082 
Control Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Firms 12,184 12,184 11,128 11,128 
Obs. 253,734 253,734 206,539 206,539 
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Table 1.9 (cont.): The Marginal Impact of Financial Stress on Profit Margin 
across Financial Firms 
2000s 
Panel OLS Dynamic Panel 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Deposit*Recession 3.2919 3.1164 
0.015 0.129 
Deposit*Condition 1.3330 1.1139 
0.075 0.423 
Finance*Recession -4.3760 -0.3916 
0.000 0.764 
Finance*Condition -4.9321 -1.5974 
0.000 0.081 
Insurance*Recession -2.3121 -2.0685 
0.000 0.000 
Insurance*Condition -0.9696 -0.3918 
0.002 0.291 
Investment*Recession -2.1004 -0.0093 
0.003 0.992 
Investment*Condition -2.6274 -1.0237 
0.000 0.069 
RealEstate*Recession -3.3123 -2.8576 
0.003 0.088 
RealEstate*Condition -3.1392 -1.3881 
0.000 0.197 
Services*Recession -4.3184 -2.9596 
0.000 0.002 
Services*Condition -3.0422 -2.4697 
0.000 0.001 
Control Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Firms 10,843 10,843 10,213 10,213 
Obs. 262,681 262,681 220,382 220,382 
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given the recent trend toward non-depository financial intermediation, because 
these firms are subject to less regulations aimed at reducing risk, and they have 
become increasingly engaged in the use of more complicated financial products. 
1.8 Robustness and Areas of Future Research 
This section discusses some issues with the robustness of the presented 
results, ways in which the paper could be improved, and areas for future research. 
The models presented here are based on those used in the literature.  
Accordingly, there are many complex variations that can be used as robustness 
checks for these results.  Naturally, when determining which model to run and 
which variables to include, some variations are left out. Including more complex 
models may yield more robust estimates with higher explanatory power. For 
example, using alternative measures of profitability may show support for the 
results presented. In unreported regressions, the alternative performance measures 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are used as the dependent 
variable in the models describing firm profitability. While the economic significance 
of the results are diminished somewhat by using these measures, the conclusions 
are not substantially different.  
This study provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial firms 
are impacted more substantially by macroeconomic shocks using evidence on both 
profitability and stock return.  However, many studies also focus on the speed at 
which macroeconomic news affects stock prices. Accordingly, different frequency 
data may be used to both add robustness to the results presented as well as to 
determine the more precise persistence of the effects. 
A final way in which this study can be improved is to include a similar 
analysis using a sample of non-financial firms that may be affected by similar 
macroeconomic conditions. Financial sector firms are chosen, because they are 
likely to be the firms most affected by the macroeconomic events affecting the 
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financial markets. However, there are many other firms that also fit this category. 
For example, firms that pay large dividends, international firms, and highly 
leveraged firms may also be more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks.  
1.9 Conclusion 
In the aftermath of one of the biggest financial collapses in recent history, it 
is natural to question the sensitivity of the financial sector to extreme 
macroeconomic distress. There are several ways to measure firm sensitivity. One 
line of literature looks at the stock price reaction surrounding economic news. 
Another focuses on how the macroeconomic regime affects the profitability of firms. 
This study contributes significantly along this line. We utilize a panel data set with 
a long time dimension and show that, while all firms seem to exhibit increased 
sensitivity to measures of financial distress, firms in the financial sector have 
become relatively more sensitive than their non-financial counterparts. In addition, 
we identify that the increased sensitivity is caused by the influence of non-
depository financial institutions, which has very important policy and governance 
implications given recent trends in the financial sector. 
We utilize a combination of firm specific and macroeconomic variables to 
build a model of firm profitability and stock returns.  Using a robust series of 
univariate and multivariate techniques, it is shown that financial sector firms are 
more sensitive to changes in financial stress, measured by a recession dummy 
variable and the Federal Reserve’s Financial Conditions Index, than their real 
sector counterparts.  We also find evidence consistent with the idea that this 
sensitivity has increased over the past three decades.         
Results showing financial firms seem to be disproportionately affected by 
economic shocks contrasts starkly with the goals of many regulations imposed upon 
the industry.  The financial sector, and depository institutions in particular, has 
been historically one of the most highly regulated. The goal of many of these 
regulations is to provide confidence and stability in the financial system in order to 
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avoid economic disasters, like that of the Great Depression in the 1930s.  Over the 
past thirty years, however, relaxing regulations in the U.S. have allowed for the 
consolidation of financial service firms that are engaging in increasingly 
interrelated transactions.  Additionally, there has been increasing complexity in the 
practices and products within the financial sector.  Among these has been the 
development of sophisticated financial products like derivatives and an increase in 
the importance of non-depository financial institutions, or “shadow” banking.  
The evidence pointing to increased systemic fragility in the financial sectors 
surrounding the recent financial crisis brings into question the soundness of these 
recent trends in regulation and financial product engineering.  Indeed, our results 
support the idea that the source of financial sector firm risk lies in non-depository 
institutions, and this effect appears to have presented after the year 2000.  The 
increased riskiness of financial institutions is consistent with the risks associated 
with the global financial market trends of consolidation, globalization, deregulation, 
financial product innovation, and the shift to shadow banking activities.  Increases 
in financial sector risk have motivated policy makers to increase the scrutiny of 
external regulators in the United States.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
of 2010 aims to offset many of the risks posed by the increased reliance on complex 
financial instruments and non-depository “shadow banking”.  For example, The Act 
creates The Financial Stability Oversight Council with the specific goal of 
monitoring the risks of bank holding companies and other non-depository 
institutions in order to prevent excessive systemic exposure. Many of the goals of 
this legislation are consistent with policy makers attempting to identify and control 
the risks evidenced by our results.  It is unlikely, however, that any individual 
provision is sufficient to completely offset the exposure seen during the financial 
crisis.  It may be necessary for all stakeholders to evaluate both the regulatory and 
governance mechanisms of financial firms, given the apparent impact of recent 
trends on financial sector risk.
 54 
2. Partial Adjustment Towards Equilibrium Mutual 
Fund Allocations: Evidence from U.S.-based Equity 
Mutual Funds 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The development and implementation of mutual funds and other pooling 
arrangements has been a major trend in the financial markets over the past several 
decades.  The economies of scale present in these arrangements lower the costs of 
diversification for smaller investors. Additionally, arrangements like mutual funds 
can provide lay investors with cheaper access to professional, active portfolio 
management. As a consequence, smaller investors have become more active in the 
financial markets through retirement and other investment accounts that utilize 
mutual funds as a main conduit for low-cost diversification. 
The cost efficiencies and active management benefits of mutual funds come at 
a cost, however. For example, there remains significant debate as to whether 
actively managed mutual funds actually outperform the overall market index on a 
risk adjusted basis after management fees are deducted.  For this reason, more 
passive pooling arrangements have been developed to answer the concerns that 
active management provides very little additional risk-adjusted return. Index and 
sector-mimicking funds, for example, allow smaller investors to reap the benefits of 
low cost diversification, while taking a more passive market stance, thus lowering 
the management fees associated with active management. 
With the development of different types of pooling arrangements, it is 
important for investors to know which types of funds are most efficient. While 
passive funds may be more cost efficient, it is possible that more actively managed 
funds can more efficiently rebalance their portfolios due to the informational 
advantages captured by active managers. While the literature in the area of mutual 
funds has often focused on the efficiency of funds in terms of return efficiency, there 
is currently no evidence showing the time dimension of mutual fund efficiency. 
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Specifically, the literature lacks empirical evidence regarding how quickly different 
types of mutual funds are able to adjust their portfolios to the equilibrium return. 
The ability of managers to quickly adjust, especially to suboptimal allocations or 
adverse market conditions, is of particular importance to investors displaying a 
significant amount of loss or risk aversion.  Therefore, this important dimension of 
efficiency is an important issue that has been left largely unanswered, since longer 
adjustment times for passively managed funds may represent additional fund risk 
that has previously been left un-quantified. 
Mutual fund managers are charged with selecting a portfolio of securities 
consistent with the fund’s objective in order to maximize the investors’ risk-adjusted 
return. The fund managers make these selections based on a set of publically 
available information.  It is safe to assume that portfolio managers are rational and 
thus have correct market expectations, given their information set. However, the set 
of information available to managers may be limited by the characteristics of the 
fund. Often times, funds specifically set out to gain informational advantages in 
certain markets, such as international markets or specific sectors of the economy. 
Fund that focus on particular markets are able to extract more or better 
information than those that are limited to more passive management; however the 
more actively managed funds face higher costs to produce the information 
advantage and pass this costs to investors in the form of higher management fees. A 
key question remains as to which approach is the most efficient for mutual fund 
investors, and the empirical literature on the topic has provided mixed results. The 
speed of adjustment may play a significant role in this debate, as the relatively low 
management fees of more passive funds may be offset by the ability of active funds 
more efficiently manage information through faster portfolio adjustment. 
In this paper, we apply a partial adjustment econometric estimation 
procedure to the CRSP mutual fund database in order to analyze how quickly 
mutual funds adjust to measures of the equilibrium risk-adjusted return.  In section 
2.6, we apply the model to the full sample of U.S. equity mutual funds, and find that 
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underperforming funds adjust relatively quickly to deviations in measures of risk-
adjusted return, which is consistent with the idea that managers face significant 
costs for underperformance. Then, in section 2.7, we apply the model to eight sub-
samples of funds based on their investment focus. We show that the speed of 
adjustment is heterogeneous across different types of funds, consistent with the 
idea that managers of different types of funds have heterogeneous information 
costs. In section 2.8, we show how the speed of adjustment for mutual funds appears 
to be consistent over time, but does exhibit some cyclicality, consistent with changes 
in the market information set under different macroeconomic regimes. Section 2.9 
discusses robustness issues as well as areas in which we hope to expand the paper. 
Section 2.10 concludes. 
2.2 Previous Empirical Findings 
The previous empirical literature on mutual fund performance and 
management show a wide range of often-conflicting results. While some studies find 
that active mutual fund managers are able to provide abnormal returns to 
investors, others find that, net of the expenses charged for active management, 
mutual funds actually underperform passively managed indexes. Other studies find 
that the abnormal return earned by mutual fund managers are essentially offset by 
management fees, essentially leaving investors with a net return equivalent to 
those of passively managed pooling arrangements. The performance of highly active 
equity mutual funds, relative to that of more passive funds, has important 
implications as to the informational efficiency of the stock market. Severe 
underperformance of mutual funds implies that investors are either irrational, 
because they fail to take advantage of better performing assets, or misinformed in 
that they are unaware that they are achieving suboptimal returns. Consistent 
positive abnormal performance, on the other hand, implies that mutual fund 
managers have superior information and pass that advantage to investors in the 
form of higher returns. However, as arbitrage occurs and the mutual fund market 
matures, it can be expected that both fund managers and investors become 
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increasingly competitive, and the aggregate equilibrium net returns for actively 
managed mutual funds equal those of alternative investments, such as index funds. 
The seminal work of Sharpe (1966) pioneered the use of empirical techniques 
to evaluate mutual fund performance. Among other contributions, Sharpe developed 
a measure of mutual fund performance that evaluates return, relative to the risk 
undertaken. The theoretical motivation for developing a risk-adjusted performance 
measure is to eliminate performance differences caused by fund idiosyncrasies such 
as investment style and risk tolerance. In an efficient market, one expects all funds 
to achieve the same risk-return tradeoff, as measured in this manner. However, the 
results of his study show that, even when using a measure that takes into 
consideration risk-adjusted returns, mutual fund performance differs among funds. 
The discrepancy in performance among mutual funds may be driven by differences 
in expenses and management fees, among other factors. The interesting results of 
Sharpe drive a line of literature dealing with relative mutual fund performance. 
Among the earlier studies responding to evidence presented by Sharpe (1966) 
and others is Ippolito (1989), which examines the role of information costs in the 
context of U.S. mutual funds. In an empirical study using data from 143 mutual 
funds over the 1965 to 1984 time period, the study finds that the returns of mutual 
funds are commensurate with those of passive funds, or the overall market, even 
after considering information costs in the form of management fees and expenses.  
The results showing that active management is worth its cost is consistent with 
market efficiency, because the fees charged by managers offset the cost of acquiring 
specialized information. Net of the fees charged for information acquisition and 
management, investors receive net returns that are equivalent to those of other 
available asset portfolios, such as index funds. In addition, Ippolito (1989) finds no 
relationship between management fees and turnover and fund performance. 
Supporting the idea that active management provides value to investors, 
Daniel et al. (1997) examine the ability of equity mutual fund managers in terms of 
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selection and timing abilities. The authors develop measures of performance based 
on fund characteristics, such as book-to-market, market capitalization, style, etc. 
They find that actively managed funds achieve performance advantages over 
passively managed funds; however, the magnitude of the advantage is small and 
roughly offset by management fees. For example, aggressive and momentum based 
funds tend to have the highest performance advantages, but they also have higher 
associated management expenses as well. 
There are also empirical studies that find active managers are able to achieve 
abnormal returns that are worth the increased expense, but that advantage is only 
realized by a minority of fund managers. For example, Kosowski et al. (2006) use a 
bootstrap methodology10 to analyze the returns of U.S. open-ended funds from 1975 
to 2002. The bootstrap methodology is necessary to circumvent problems with non-
normality of alphas in the distribution of mutual fund returns11. In light of the 
bootstrap methodology, the authors find that there are some managers who are able 
to generate returns that offset the associated fees charged. In addition, they find 
that the ability of some active mutual funds managers to achieve abnormal returns 
persists over time12. In addition, Volkman (1999) investigates the performance of 
mutual funds in the context of increased market volatility and finds that active 
mutual funds, in aggregate, do not possess superior stock selection ability, but some 
managers are able to consistently select undervalued securities. In addition, even 
though some managers exhibit superior stock selection skill, their ability to time 
the market is often not optimal.13 
                                                        
10 They argue that this methodology is necessary to eliminate biases due to non-normal distributions 
caused by ex post sorting on mutual fund performance. 
11 Other studies, such as Fama and French (2010) also advocate the use of bootstrapping 
methodologies in dealing with distribution issues. 
12 They find that this result holds mostly for managers of growth-oriented funds, but find no evidence 
that income-oriented funds achieve persistent abnormal returns. 
13 The results also suggest a negative relationship between management compensation and selection 
ability – a puzzling result. In addition, the results find that larger funds tend to have better stock 
selection ability. 
 59 
Barras et al. (2010) provide further evidence that mutual funds do not 
consistently provide abnormal returns in aggregate. They attribute previous 
findings that mutual funds experience persistent positive alpha as “false 
discoveries”. In their methodology, they divide funds based on whether their 
managers are skilled or unskilled and find that 75 percent of funds do not exhibit 
positive alpha. In a related finding, they show that there were significantly more 
“skilled” funds in existence in 1996 than in 200614, which supports the idea that 
increased competition and access to information has removed the ability of mutual 
fund managers to yield abnormal returns, net of expenses. They argue that, 
although there is a minority of “skilled” managers who can achieve a relatively high 
return, actively managed funds underperform (net of expenses) in aggregate due to 
the persistence of underperforming funds. 
There is also a line of literature which argues that results showing persistent 
positive abnormal returns for active managers are driven by specific biases and 
methodological issues that, when corrected, question the efficiency of actively 
managed mutual funds. In an early empirical study along this line, Lehmann and 
Modest (1987) examine 130 U.S. mutual funds from 1968 to 1982.  The empirical 
results indicate that estimates of mutual fund performance are sensitive to the 
pricing model and estimation method used to compute abnormal returns. The 
authors use various specifications of the CAPM and APT and different estimation 
techniques and find significantly different estimates of mutual fund abnormal 
performance. However, despite this fact, they still find that both CAPM and APT 
estimates show that mutual funds experience negative abnormal returns, which the 
authors find difficult to explain in an information efficient market. In addition, 
Kothari and Warner (2001) point to evidence suggesting that typical empirical tests 
of mutual fund performance are of low power. They use simulated funds that mimic 
the behavior of actual funds, and the results show that typical empirical tests are 
very weak in detecting skill-based abnormal portfolio returns, especially when the 
                                                        
14 They also cite that this trend makes identification of the skilled funds more accurate in later 
years. 
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characteristics of funds differ greatly from the market portfolio. As an alternative, 
the authors suggest that the power of tests can be improved by conducting event 
studies on mutual fund trading behavior15. 
Further evidence by Elton et al. (1993) show that early evidence claiming the 
persistence of mutual fund abnormal performance was primarily driven by the 
portfolio used in deriving the abnormal performance measures. The authors show 
using a sample spanning from 1965 to 1984 that estimated risk-adjusted measures 
of performance for mutual funds imply that mutual funds are not efficient enough 
to justify their expenses. The authors attribute most of the cost of active 
management their associated information costs and conclude that previous 
literature implying positive alphas or abnormal returns is due to the exclusion of 
non-S&P assets in the calculation of performance evaluation measures.  They find 
that accounting for these assets shows that actively managed funds underperform 
more mechanical or passive funds. In addition, funds with high fees and turnover 
underperform those with low fees and turnover. These results imply that actively 
managed funds are inefficient. 
Additional evidence by Wermers (2000) evaluates the ability of managers to 
select stocks that outperform enough to cover costs. Their results show that, while 
managers tend to select stocks that outperform the market index by over one 
percentage point per year, the net returns underperform by roughly one percentage 
point per year. The authors attribute the majority of this discrepancy to expenses 
and transaction costs. However, they show that high turnover funds tend to perform 
well, which suggests that active management may add some value to investors. 
They also draw attention to the negative impact on mutual fund performance of 
cash and bond holdings that must be maintained to account for the uncertain cash 
flows into and out of funds. Bollen and Busse (2005) examine the ability of 
managers to attain persistent abnormal returns by sorting mutual funds into 
                                                        
15 This study focuses on the ability to identify if a particular fund is able to achieve abnormal 
returns. 
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percentiles based on performance and find that the highest percentile performance 
funds are unable to maintain high levels of abnormal performance over time. 
In a more recent study, Fama and French (2010) concur with many previous 
studies that actively managed mutual funds rarely have abnormal returns high 
enough to overcome their significantly higher expenses. As a result, the real returns 
to mutual fund investors tend to be below those that are expected from the market 
portfolio. The authors use CRSP data from 1984 to 2006 and a bootstrap 
methodology to differentiate skill from luck in the cross section of mutual fund 
returns. Consistent with earlier findings, the results show that a small percentage 
of managers appear to outperform the market, but that their good performance is 
offset in the cross section by those that do not meet performance expectations, net of 
costs.  In addition, they find evidence that even the top performing active funds do 
not seem to outperform efficiently managed passive funds. 
There is also a line of empirical literature that relates the manager 
characteristics of mutual funds to performance. In one such study, Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) analyze the flows into and out of mutual funds. They find that investors tend 
to funnel money into mutual funds with good prior performance. However, they 
document that this trend is asymmetric in that investors fail to flee worse 
performing funds. They find a significant relationship between expenses and fund 
inflows, which the authors attribute to more aggressive marketing efforts, which 
present as higher fees. In addition, funds that are part of a large fund family exhibit 
higher inflows as well. These results are consistent with the explanation that funds 
with lower search costs for investors can realize significantly more cash inflows. 
An empirical analysis that more directly ties manager characteristics with 
mutual fund performance is Chevalier and Ellison (1999).   Chevalier and Ellison 
examine manager characteristics such as age, SAT score, and undergraduate 
institution and find that there is little relationship between fund performance and 
manager characteristics. However, there is a significant relationship between 
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managers who attended high-SAT undergraduate institution and mutual fund 
performance16. They suggest this is due to the innate ability of the manager, better 
education, better access to social networks, or some combination of effects. The 
results are consistent with a market having incomplete information and increased 
competition, whereby only slight advantages can be maintained. In a related study, 
Khorana (1996) shows that well performing funds are less likely to experience 
managerial turnover17. This finding shows that managers have good reason to be 
concerned about relative performance, as deviation from optimal performance levels 
may result in their replacement. 
Our study contributes to the mutual fund literature by applying a partial 
adjustment methodology to the mutual fund performance characteristics in an 
attempt to estimate the efficiency of mutual fund managers. Measuring the 
adjustment speed not only has important implications with regards to the efficiency 
of actively managed funds, but also provides insights into how fund managers weigh 
the various costs associated with portfolio rebalancing. The insights gained from 
this analysis fills an important gap in the current literature. 
2.3 The Model 
Mutual fund managers are charged with using the available information in 
the financial markets in order to maximize risk-adjusted return. Since the risk-
adjusted return is based on economic fundamentals, there should exist an 
equilibrium or target level of risk-adjusted return. Thus, the mutual fund manager 
aims to achieve at least the equilibrium risk-adjusted return. Failure to do so can 
lead to cash outflows, as investors funnel capital into competing funds, which, if not 
corrected, will result in the manager’s replacement. The realized return of mutual 
funds should equal the equilibrium return over the long-run. However, in any given 
                                                        
16 They also find that younger managers tend to make higher risk-adjusted returns than older 
managers. 
17 Managerial turnover is also found to be correlated with fund turnover, expenses, and overall 
portfolio risk. 
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period, individual returns will deviate from the equilibrium due to both poor 
investment decisions and random price movements.  When the fund returns are 
below those of other funds of equivalent risk, the managers will have an incentive to 
rebalance the portfolio with securities that will close the deviation from the 
equilibrium. However, portfolio rebalancing is costly.  The costs of rebalancing 
include the search and information costs necessary to insure the selected securities 
will achieve the desired risk and return trade-off.  Thus, the mutual fund manager 
faces a rebalancing decision where he or she must balance the benefits of retaining 
investors through a more efficient allocation with the costs of rebalancing. 
The mutual fund manager’s problem of balancing the costs and benefits of 
portfolio reallocation are consistent with a model of partial adjustment towards a 
target or equilibrium.  Partial adjustment models can be applied in cases where 
there is a long-run equilibrium or optimal level for a variable of interest. Such 
models have been commonly applied to describe key relationships in Economics and 
Finance, such as the optimal level of leverage in a corporate finance context or the 
long-run equilibrium GDP growth of a country. Kennan (1979) describes the 
application of partial adjustment models to optimal behavior decisions in economic 
contexts and shows that, provided expectations are rational, the observed variables 
in question can be used in a partial adjustment model without having to directly 
observe the (unobservable) beliefs of the agents. As a result, the partial adjustment 
estimation will produce consistent estimates of the adjustment parameters.  In the 
context of mutual fund performance, Cho and Shin (2011) develop a partial 
adjustment model based on a model whereby investors identify funds based on the 
past ability of managers to achieve returns and the assumption that there is partial 
adjustment in mutual fund portfolios. In the context of the paper, the authors show 
that a “smart money effect” exists for younger funds in Korea, because investors are 
uncertain as to the manager’s ability18. 
                                                        
18 Consequently, the cash flow adjustment to and from these funds is higher, and these funds tend to 
outperform older funds. Additionally, the effect diminishes as funds age. 
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In a partial adjustment model, the economic relationship of interest can 
generalized as: 
 

!  "  #    (2.1) 
In (1), 

! is the equilibrium or optimal value of some variable of interest. In 
this study, we focus on the long-run risk-adjusted returns of equity mutual funds, 
such as measures calculated using a Sharpe or Treynor ratio, or the abnormal 
returns from an asset-pricing model. The parameter " is the long-run equilibrium 
measure of risk-adjusted return, and # is a vector of variables that affect the long-
run equilibrium return. Factors influencing the optimal risk-adjusted return of a 
mutual fund include the risk-adjusted return of the market index and the risk-
adjusted return of a fund of a similar risk or style, among others. 
Due to the costs of adjustment, mutual fund managers may choose to not 
continuously adjust their portfolios towards the equilibrium. Instead, the manager 
may choose to only attempt to offset some of the deviation.  Thus, the change in the 
risk-adjusted return from one period to the next is given by: 
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The parameter ' in (2) represents the proportion of the deviation from the 
optimum in one period that is reversed in the following period, or speed of 
adjustment.  In the case of observed mutual fund returns, ' will express both the 
amount of deviation that is offset due to purposeful managerial portfolio 
rebalancing, plus a component that is due to random variation or mean reversion. 
In order to model the partial adjustment that mutual fund managers undergo 
in rebalancing portfolios, we can plug (1) into (2), rearrange, and simplify, to yield: 
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The parameters in Equation (3) can be estimated using the regression model: 
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The estimation of (4) will yield the parameter estimate ,, which can be used 
to estimate '- as '-  1 $  ,. '- describes the percentage deviation from the optimal or 
target risk-adjusted return that is offset in one period. If there is partial adjustment 
towards a target, '- is bounded between 0 and 1. The other parameters of interest 
can be estimated similarly as, - 
/0
(&% 12)
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In the above representation of the partial adjustment model, we note that the 
estimate of adjustment speed, '-, has two components: rebalancing decisions of the 
fund managers and random price movements. Additionally, '- is assumed to be 
equal whether adjustment is taking place from either below or above the target or 
equilibrium.  However, this is not likely to apply in the case of mutual fund portfolio 
rebalancing.  A mutual fund manager who achieves a return below the target has a 
great deal of incentive to rebalance toward the optimum. This has become 
increasingly true over time, as competition among mutual funds has increased and 
investors realizing sub-optimal returns will abandon their funds for more successful 
funds or other pooling arrangements.  Conversely, a mutual fund manager who 
achieves a return above the target equilibrium (whether through superior security 
selection or luck) has less incentive to expend the cost necessary to significantly 
rebalance the portfolio. In fact, remaining above the equilibrium, or over-
performing, while likely not feasible in an efficient market over the long run, may 
be a short-term goal of mutual fund managers. As a result, we expect very little 
incentive for adjustment when performance exceeds that of the equilibrium. 
In the case where the speed of adjustment, '-, changes with the direction of 
the deviation from the optimum, the Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Model is more 
appropriate. In the asymmetric partial adjustment model, the econometric 
specification in (4) is modified into: 
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High in (5) is a dummy variable equal to one if the level of risk-adjusted return is 
above that of the previous period (and, hence, the equilibrium), and zero if not.  
Similarly, Low is an indicator equal to one if the return is below that of the previous 
period, and zero if not.  Therefore, the asymmetric partial adjustment model in (5) 
estimates two separate adjustment speeds. & measures the speed of adjustment 
parameter when the level of return is above the equilibrium and  9 measures the 
speed when the return is below the optimum. The associated speed of adjustments 
can be measured by '-&  1 $  ,& and '-9  1 $  ,9, respectively. A priori, given the 
competitive mutual fund environment and the lack of incentives for correcting 
deviations when performance is abnormally good, we expect managers to have an 
incentive to adjust as quickly as possible when fund performance is bad. Thus, we 
expect '-9 < '-& , or  ,& < ,9. 
2.4 Estimation Methodology 
We apply the asymmetric partial adjustment framework in a panel data 
setting using a fixed effect estimation procedure.  The dependent variable in our 
empirical framework is a risk-adjusted measure of mutual fund return. In our study 
we compute three measures of risk-adjusted return. The first is a modified version 
of the ratio defined by Sharpe (1966), 
7, 
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, (2.6) 
which is the average return, scaled by its standard deviation. In (6), , is the 
average return for mutual fund i across the time period t, and =(>?,@) is the standard 
deviation of the return for mutual fund i across period t.  The Sharpe ratio 
essentially measures the return achieved by a mutual fund per unit of risk taken. 
This ratio should be determined by financial market and economic conditions, and 
there should be an optimal or target Sharpe ratio that is achievable in the financial 
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markets.  Therefore, the partial adjust model that measures the degree to which 
fund managers balance the costs and benefits of rebalancing portfolios towards the 
optimal ratio can be appropriately measured by the asymmetric partial adjustment 
model. The second risk-adjusted measure of return is similar to that defined by 
Treynor (1966): 
A
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, (2.7) 
where , is the average return for mutual fund i across period t, and (>?,@) is the 
beta coefficient calculated using the CAPM single factor model for mutual fund i 
across period t. This is another measure of risk-adjusted return that, unlike the 
Sharpe ratio, scales the fund’s return by the amount of risk that that particular 
fund will contribute to a diversified portfolio. Again, economic conditions should 
dictate a long-run equilibrium level of the Treynor ratio that is attainable by 
investors. The third and final measure of risk-adjusted return is the alpha defined 
by Jensen (1968), which is the intercept term from the single factor CAPM. Alpha 
measures the fund’s abnormal return, or the amount of return investors yield from 
the mutual fund manager’s skill. A positive value of alpha is an indication that the 
manager is efficient; however, expenses and transaction costs can offset benefits 
attained by realizing a positive alpha. 
The general econometric specifications we use to estimate how quickly 
mutual funds adjust to their respective optimal portfolio allocations are represented 
by: 
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The empirical specification in (2.8) – (2.10) is the same as that presented in (2.5) 
with the addition of a second set of asymmetric adjustment parameters that 
measure the degree to which the deviation from the equilibrium return is reversed 
by the next two periods.  These adjustment parameters are estimated by the &9 and 
99 parameters.  These coefficients can have important implications with regards to 
the time series properties of the variable and, thus, help to ensure the proper 
specification of the model. The vector of variables that determine the target or 
equilibrium risk-adjusted return achievable by each respective fund, #, are the 
market Sharpe Ratio (Market Sharpe) and the average Sharpe ratio for a mutual 
fund within the same Lipper Classification (Classification Sharpe) as denoted by 
the CRSP Mutual Fund dataset for (8), the market return (market beta is unity) 
(Market Treynor) and the average Treynor ratio for a mutual fund within the same 
Lipper Classification (Classification Treynor) for (9), and the average alpha for a 
mutual fund within the same Lipper Classification (Classification Alpha) for (10).  
The Lipper Classification classifies mutual funds by the types of securities they are 
chartered to purchase. 
2.5 The Data 
The data for this study are from the CRSP U.S.-based Mutual Fund dataset. 
Daily and monthly mutual fund returns from January 2000 through December 2013 
are analyzed. Daily data are used to compute monthly and quarterly performance 
measures for each mutual fund, and monthly data are used to compute yearly 
measures. Market index returns and the U.S. risk free rate data are from the 
website of Kenneth French.  The data are windsorized at the one percent level for 
each performance measure under study in order to reduce the influence of outliers 
and data errors.  In addition, daily observations displaying a zero return are 
omitted in order to remove any bias due to illiquidity. The mutual fund return data 
are merged with annual summary information from CRSP, which includes 
information describing the fund, including net asset value, fund family, 
management fees, age of the fund, fund management group, etc. 
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Additionally, in an extension of our basic results, in Section 2.7 we test 
whether the speed of adjustment is heterogeneous among different types of mutual 
funds. For this purpose, we divide the sample of U.S. equity funds into eight 
“styles”, based on their Lipper Objective defined in the CRSP dataset. The eight 
styles differ in terms of the range of securities that are considered for inclusion in 
the fund; thus, information costs should be heterogeneous across several of the fund 
styles. In our analysis, we exclude all funds that focus primarily on purchasing debt 
and other fixed income securities and consider funds that primarily invest in 
equities. The sample of equity mutual funds is divided into the following styles 
categories: General Equity Funds, International Funds, International Focused 
Funds, Global Funds, Global Focused Funds, Sector Funds, Emerging Market 
Funds, and Market Index Funds. General Equity Funds are funds that primarily 
purchase the equities of U.S. firms through a variety of strategies, but are not 
focused on any specific market or sector. International Funds are funds that 
primarily focus on investing in international assets, but are not focused on specific 
international sectors or markets, while International Focused Funds invest in 
international assets that are located in more specific international sectors or 
markets. Likewise, Global Funds are those that invest in a portfolio of global assets, 
but are not focused a specific region or industry, while Global Focused Funds 
purchase global assets that are concentrated in specific markets or sectors. Sector 
funds are those that are focused on purchasing equities from specific sectors of the 
U.S. economy. Emerging Market funds are those that focus on purchasing assets in 
emerging markets, which are typically more informationally opaque, and, 
consequently, more risky.  Finally, Market Index Funds are those that are designed 
to mimic the returns of the overall market, as defined by a market benchmark such 
as the S&P 500.  Funds are assigned to each group based on their respective Lipper 
Objectives. Table 2.1 presents the mapping of the Lipper Objectives to the eight 
styles defined by this analysis. 
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Table 2.1: Equity Style Designation by Lipper Objective 
We divide the CRSP sample of U.S.-based mutual funds into different classes, or "styles" of equity 
funds. This paper analyzes U.S. equity funds, so funds focused on purchasing debt securities and 
other fixed income securities are omitted from the sample. The remaining sample of equity funds 
are divided into eight categories, based on the fund's Lipper Objective, as defined in the CRSP 
database. 
Style Lipper Objective 
Sector 
Basic Materials Funds Natural Resources Funds 
Consumer Goods Funds Science & Technology Funds 
Consumer Services Funds Specialty/Miscellaneous Funds 
Financial Services Funds Real Estate Funds 
Gold Oriented Funds Telecommunication Funds 
Health/Biotechnology Funds Utility Funds 
Industrials Funds   
International 
International Funds International Small-Cap Funds 
International Income Funds   
International Focused 
International Real Estate Funds Japanese Funds 
China Region Funds Pacific Ex Japan Funds 
European Region Funds Pacific Region Funds 
Emerging Markets Emerging Markets Funds Latin American Funds 
General Equity 
Equity Market Neutral Funds Income Funds 
Long/Short Equity Funds Flexible Portfolio Funds 
Flexible Income Funds Balanced Funds 
Growth and Income Funds Multi-Sector Income Funds 
Growth Funds High Current Yield Funds 
Mid-Cap Funds Equity Income Funds 
Small-cap Funds   
Global 
Global Funds Global Income Funds 
Global Small-Cap Funds   
Global Focused 
Global Financial Services Funds 
Global Natural Resources 
Funds 
Global Health/Biotechnology Funds 
Global Science/Technology 
Funds 
Global Flexible Port Funds Global Real Estate Funds 
Market S&P 500 Index Objective Funds   
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Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of several key variables for the 
sample of U.S. equity funds under observation from January 2000 to December 
2012.  The first column presents the summary statistics for the full sample of U.S. 
equity funds, which consists of 1,885,540 observations for approximately 22,900 
U.S.-based equity mutual funds.  The average monthly return for a fund in the 
sample is approximately 0.6 percent. The average monthly Sharpe ratio for the full 
sample is 0.074 with a standard deviation of 0.226. A positive Sharpe ratio indicates 
a positive relationship between risk and return, as expected. The relatively small 
value of the average Sharpe ratio indicates that, when computed using daily 
observations, daily returns are small, compared with the standard deviation of daily 
returns. The average Treynor ratio is also positive, with an average value of 0.048 
and a standard deviation of 0.416. In addition, the average value of alpha is slightly 
positive, at 0.007. The average mutual fund in the sample has a net asset value 
(NAV) of $16.38 and total net assets (TNA) of $443 million. The average fund also 
charges average management fees of 0.67 percent per year and has an average 
turnover ratio of 1.67 times per year. 
Table 2.2 also shows summary statistics for the style subsamples of equity 
mutual funds previously defined by their Lipper Objective Codes.  The statistics 
show that Emerging Market Funds yield the highest average monthly returns of 
1.69 percent per month, followed by Sector funds with 0.97 percent. The Market 
Index Funds have the lowest monthly returns of about 0.3 percent per month. 
However, emerging markets also appear to be the most risky, as emerging market 
funds have a monthly return standard deviation of 6.75 percent, followed by Sector 
funds with a standard deviation of 6.17 percent. Market Index funds have the 
lowest monthly return standard deviation of 4.67 percent. The summary statistics 
of U.S. equity funds display the key property that funds that invest in markets that 
yield higher returns are subject to higher risk. In addition, since market index and 
funds are more passively managed, the summary statistics are consistent with prior 
literature that actively managed funds yield higher returns. However, whether  
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Table 2.2: U.S. Equity Fund Summary Statistics 
Summary Statistics for the sample of CRSP mutual funds from January 2000 to 
December 2012. The CRSP sample of mutual funds is divided into different styles 
of U.S.-based equity funds. Funds focused on purchasing debt securities and other 
fixed income securities are omitted, and the remaining sample of equity funds are 
divided into eight categories, based on the fund's Lipper Objective, as defined in 
the CRSP database (See Table 2.1). The return data are sampled monthly. Daily 
data are used to report monthly measures of risk-adjusted return (Sharpe Ratio, 
Treynor Ratio, and Alpha). Fund characteristics (NAV, TNA, Turnover, Fees, etc.) 
are reported annually. The data are windsorized at the 1% tails for each 
performance ratio (Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, and Alpha). 
Variable 
Full 
Sample 
Emerging 
Markets 
General 
Equity Global 
Monthly Return (%) 
Mean 0.589 1.693 0.496 0.604 
Std. Dev.  5.154 6.751 4.889 4.847 
Sharpe Ratio 
Mean 0.074 0.113 0.074 0.083 
Std. Dev.  0.226 0.264 0.227 0.235 
Treynor Ratio 
Mean 0.048 0.144 0.041 0.036 
Std. Dev.  0.416 0.565 0.377 0.512 
Alpha 
Mean 0.007 0.053 0.003 0.007 
Std. Dev.  0.126 0.216 0.105 0.122 
Net Asset Value ($) 
Mean 16.38 20.29 15.77 15.89 
Std. Dev.  15.45 15.47 15.77 10.01 
Totoal Net Assets ($ millions) 
Mean 443 543 431 462 
Std. Dev.  2,436 2,481 2,287 2,732 
12-1b Fees 
Mean 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Std. Dev.  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Management Fees (%) 
Mean 0.667 0.996 0.632 0.716 
Std. Dev.  0.320 0.348 0.310 0.306 
Turnover 
Mean 1.67 0.87 1.95 0.88 
Std. Dev.  291.45 1.69 351.08 0.99 
N 1,885,540 40,536 1,303,178 87,690 
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Table 2.2 (cont.): U.S. Equity Fund Summary Statistics   
Variable 
Global 
Focused International 
International 
Focused Market Sector 
Monthly Return (%) 
Mean 0.650 0.614 0.929 0.296 0.972 
Std. Dev.  5.454 5.474 5.945 4.670 6.173 
Sharpe Ratio 
Mean 0.078 0.070 0.070 0.055 0.072 
Std. Dev.  0.224 0.221 0.221 0.197 0.214 
Treynor Ratio 
Mean 0.058 0.054 0.114 0.022 0.068 
Std. Dev.  0.379 0.517 0.673 0.234 0.426 
Alpha 
Mean 0.007 0.005 0.026 -0.001 0.025 
Std. Dev.  0.134 0.149 0.193 0.047 0.189 
Net Asset Value ($) 
Mean 15.25 14.86 17.92 24.10 20.78 
Std. Dev.  11.36 9.72 13.17 27.13 17.72 
Totoal Net Assets ($ millions) 
Mean 438 496 257 2,029 223 
Std. Dev.  1,476 2,343 985 8,838 921 
12-1b Fees 
Mean 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
Std. Dev.  0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Management Fees (%) 
Mean 0.684 0.782 0.789 0.193 0.736 
Std. Dev.  0.314 0.286 0.315 0.127 0.302 
Turnover 
Mean 0.90 0.85 1.06 0.11 1.62 
Std. Dev.  1.29 0.95 2.81 0.23 3.67 
N 43,471 178,128 42,295 27,424 162,818 
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these higher returns are high enough to offset their expenses is another question. 
Indeed, Emerging Market Funds also have the highest management fees of 
approximately 1 percent per year, while Market focused funds have the lowest of 
0.19 percent. The summary statistics show that Market Index Funds have the 
lowest Sharpe ratio of 0.055, followed by International and International Focused 
Funds (0.070), Sector Funds (0.072), General Equity (0.074), Global Focused Funds 
(0.078), Global Funds (0.083), and Emerging Markets (0.113).  Similar trends are 
revealed for the Treynor ratios and alphas. Additionally, General Equity funds have 
the highest turnover of 1.95 times, while Market funds have the lowest of 0.11 
times.  In general, the summary statistics support the idea that focused funds 
appear to show some efficiency advantages over passive, or non-focused, funds, as 
evidenced by higher average risk-adjusted returns. Whether the higher risk-
adjusted returns of more focused funds adequately offset their higher management 
fees has often been debated. We shed further light on this issue by examining the 
speed at which mutual fund managers of different types of firms are able to adjust 
their portfolios. 
2.6 Partial Adjustment in U.S.-based Equity Mutual Funds 
The results of the fixed effect econometric estimation of the asymmetric 
partial adjustment model using monthly measures of risk-adjusted returns are 
presented in Table 2.3. Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.3 represent the partial 
adjustment estimations using the Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, and Alpha, as 
dependent variables, respectively. In Panel A, the coefficient highadjust1 measures 
the speed of adjustment parameter when the Sharpe ratio is above the target or 
equilibrium ratio. A coefficient of 0.205 implies that, when a fund achieves higher 
than optimal performance, as measured by the Sharpe Ratio, approximately 80 
percent (1-0.205) of that deviation is offset in the next period (month). 
Correspondingly, the coefficient lowadjust1 of -0.0471 implies that when a mutual 
fund is below its equilibrium risk return tradeoff, approximately 105 percent of the 
deviation is offset within one month. The coefficients for the second lag of Sharpe 
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ratio, highasjust2 and lowasjust2, are either not statistically significant or very 
close to zero, implying that equilibrium is restored within the next two periods. The 
Market Sharpe ratio and Classification Sharpe coefficients are both positive and 
significant at the one percent level, as expected a priori.  The standard asymmetric 
partial adjustment model appears to fit the data well. The R-squared value for the 
model presented in Panel A, using the Sharpe Ratio as the dependent variable, is 
0.706. 
Panel B shows the results of the asymmetric partial adjustment model when 
the Treynor Ratio is used as the dependent variable. The coefficient 0.12 for 
highadjust1 implies that, when a fund’s Treynor Ratio is above above equilibrium, 
approximately 88 percent of the deviation will be offset in the next period. The 
coefficient lowadjust1 is insignificant, however, which implies that, when a mutual 
fund’s Treynor Ratio is below that of the equilibrium, there is no partial 
adjustment. In other words, managers fully adjust the portfolio to the equilibrium. 
Again, the coefficients for the second lag of the dependent variable, highasjust2 and 
lowasjust2, are either not statistically significant or very close to zero.  In addition, 
the coefficients for Market Return and Classification Treynor are positive and 
significant at the five percent level, as expected. The R-squared value for the model 
presented in Panel B, where the Treynor Ratio is the dependent variable, is 0.422. 
Similar results are reported in Panel C, where Jensen’s alpha is used as the 
dependent value. The highadjust1 coefficient is 0.12, similar to that of Panel B, 
while the lowadjust1 coefficient is -0.036 in Panel C, implying the a fund making 
less than the equilibrium alpha is able to more than offset the deviation in the next 
period by making a single-period adjustment of 103.6 percent. 
The results presented in Panels A, B, and C of Table 2.3 provide consistent 
evidence with regards to the speed at which mutual funds are able to adjust their 
portfolios in order to achieve equilibrium (or higher) levels of risk-adjusted return.  
The resulting coefficients for highadjust1 are positive and significant across the  
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Table 2.3: Monthly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation 
Monthly fixed effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment 
model presented in Eqs. (8)-(10) for U.S.-based equity mutual funds from 
January 2000 to December 2012. Results are presented using several 
measures of risk-adjusted return, Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, and Alpha. 
Independent variables are associated measures of the market risk-
adjusted return and the risk-adjusted return of an average fund in the 
same Lipper Class. Second order lags of the dependent variable are also 
included to ensure proper specification of the model. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Sharpe Ratio   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.0242*** 0.0044 5.472 0.000 
highadjust1 0.2050*** 0.0296 6.924 0.000 
highadjust2 0.0004*** 0.0001 2.750 0.006 
lowadjust1 -0.0471** 0.0181 -2.593 0.010 
lowadjust2 0.0000 0.0001 0.220 0.826 
Market Sharpe 0.9104*** 0.0196 46.353 0.000 
Classification Sharpe 0.0185*** 0.0047 3.906 0.000 
R-Square 0.706 
No. of Funds 22,939 
N 1,865,715       
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Treynor Ratio   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.0291*** 0.0062 4.725 0.000 
highadjust1 0.1182*** 0.0306 3.861 0.000 
highadjust2 0.0000* 0.0000 1.959 0.050 
lowadjust1 -0.0094 0.0198 -0.474 0.635 
lowadjust2 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.111 0.912 
Market Return 0.0541*** 0.0012 46.202 0.000 
Classification Treynor 0.0001** 0.0000 2.116 0.034 
R-Square 0.422 
No. of Funds 22,939 
N 1,865,715       
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Table 2.3 (cont.): Monthly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment 
Estimation 
Panel C: Dependent Variable - Alpha   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.0071*** 0.0002 32.376 0.000 
highadjust1 0.1169*** 0.0054 21.645 0.000 
highadjust2 0.0016 0.0011 1.481 0.139 
lowadjust1 -0.036*** 0.0034 -10.526 0.000 
lowadjust2 0.0126*** 0.0027 4.609 0.000 
Classification Alpha 0.6966*** 0.0106 65.723 0.000 
R-Square 0.452 
No. of Funds 22,939 
N 1,866,031       
 
three specifications in Table 2.3, which implies that there is some 
persistence, or relatively little adjustment, when fund performance is relatively 
good. The coefficient lowadjust1 is negative across specifications and significant in 
two out of the three specifications of Table 2.3. While a negative adjustment 
coefficient normally violates an assumption of the partial adjustment model, it does 
not in the case of asymmetric adjustment in mutual funds. A negative lowadjust1 
coefficient implies that funds completely offset the deviation and are able to reverse 
their performance in one period. In cases where there is a definitive “target” level of 
some variable, the partial adjustment model assumes that there are costs for a 
deviation in either direction, which implies that adjustment coefficients should 
theoretically be between 0 and 1. However, in the context of mutual fund 
performance, a negative adjustment parameter represents an underperforming fund 
becoming an over performing one in the next period – a situation that a mutual 
fund manager would welcome, especially in a highly competitive environment. 
The use of the asymmetric adjustment model makes a significant difference 
in terms of interpreting the overall efficiency of mutual funds. The relatively low 
adjustment speed when a fund is above the equilibrium value is consistent with the 
fact that there is no incentive for managers to adjust when the fund is 
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outperforming and adds support for the implementation of the asymmetrical partial 
adjustment model.  Particularly good outcomes tend to be transitory and the effects 
are short lived, as the market naturally restores equilibrium. However, the 
relatively high adjustment speed when the performance measures are below the 
equilibrium value indicates that poorly performing fund managers are able and 
willing to adjust portfolios quickly in order to bring fund performance back to (or 
above) the equilibrium level.  This is consistent with prior evidence that managers 
are sensitive to poor performance.  Managers may perceive the costs of adjustment 
to be low, relative to the benefits of keeping current investors and attracting new 
investors through the realization of high relative returns.  These results imply that 
managers are fairly efficient in that they are able to quickly offset deviations in 
fund performance. 
2.7 Heterogeneous Adjustment Across Mutual Fund Styles 
One of the benefits of actively managed mutual funds is that they allow lay 
investors to benefit from the information gathering ability and expertise of 
professional managers who are familiar with specific areas of the financial markets.  
However, mutual funds often have different objectives that may require gathering 
different types of information. Thus, there may be differences in the costs of 
portfolio adjustment across different fund types. As a result, the estimated speed of 
adjustment may be different across fund types as well. In this section, we divide the 
sample based on the eight previously defined styles and examine the speed of 
adjustment estimates across fund types. 
Each fund style in our sample is focused on purchasing equity securities; 
however, some funds are more specific with regards to the geographical locations 
and industries of the assets under consideration. As a consequence, managers will 
face heterogeneous information costs across fund styles, which may have important 
implications with regards to their willingness and ability to quickly adjust their 
funds’ portfolios. For example, managers investing in emerging markets face 
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relatively high information costs, because emerging markets are less integrated 
with developed markets and are subject to greater uncertainty. In order to succeed 
in emerging markets, the managers must expend more resources in order to acquire 
accurate information, which makes them competitive in this market.  As a result, 
the managers of emerging market funds should capitalize on the information 
advantage (that they paid for) through more efficient portfolio adjustment, either in 
the form of higher risk-adjusted returns, or more optimal portfolio adjustment. 
Consequently, in the context of this paper, a priori, we expect the speed of 
adjustment for Emerging Market Funds and the like to be more optimal than that 
of Market and General Equity Funds, due to differences in information costs and 
advantages.  The monthly fixed effect estimations of the asymmetric partial 
adjustment model are presented for each style subsample of mutual funds in Tables 
2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. 
Table 2.4 presents the fixed effect estimation for the asymmetric partial 
adjustment model across different fund styles using the Sharpe ratio as the 
dependent variable.  A major result is consistent with the full sample estimation of 
asymmetric adjustment – the adjustment speed when the Sharpe ratio is above the 
equilibrium value is relatively slow, when compared to when the Sharpe ratio is 
below the equilibrium value. This result is consistent across all styles of U.S. equity 
mutual funds specified in this study.  Additionally, The Market Sharpe and 
Classification Sharpe coefficients are all positive and consistently statistically 
significant across all fund types, which is consistent with a priori expectations. The 
partial adjustment model applied in this study best describes the behavior of 
Market Index Funds, as this specification has an R-squared value of 0.994. This is 
not surprising, since the measures used to estimate adjustment speed are based on 
statistics derived from market data. The model consistently explains the 
adjustment dynamics across funds styles, with R-squared values of 0.76, 0.72, 0.66, 
0.61, 0.58, 0.55, 0.52 for General Equity, Global Focused, International, Global, 
Emerging Markets, International Focused, and Sector funds, respectively. 
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More importantly, Table 2.4 provides further results regarding the relative 
efficiency of mutual funds that are charged with purchasing different types of 
securities.  We begin by analyzing the speed of adjustment when the Sharpe Ratio 
is above that of the equilibrium, or the fund is performing relatively well. The 
highadjust1 coefficient is highest (adjustment is slowest) for Emerging Market 
Funds at 0.33, meaning 67 percent (1-0.33) of the deviation is offset in one period. 
Global, International Focused, International, and Sector Funds adjust more quickly, 
with coefficients of 0.27, 0.30, 0.27, and 0.23, respectively. On the other hand, 
Market and General Equity Funds adjust among the fastest with coefficients of 
0.0148 and 0.1739, respectively. In the context of mutual fund performance, this 
means funds that focus on more specialized markets and typically acquire more 
specific market information are able to achieve more prolonged above average 
performance.  Therefore, in the context of adjustment from above the equilibrium, 
slower adjustment is good from the perspective of mutual fund managers and 
investors.  The results in Table 2.4 imply that funds that have a more focused style 
are more efficient at maintaining high levels of risk-adjusted returns. We find 
similar results when the Sharpe Ratio is below the equilibrium value, implying a 
suboptimal portfolio. The lowadjust1 coefficient of -0.11 is relatively lowest (faster 
adjustment) for Sector Funds, implying that Sector Funds offset 111 percent of the 
deviation from the equilibrium Sharpe ratio in one period. Also among the fund 
styles that adjust relatively quickly are Emerging Market, Global, Global Focused, 
and International Funds, with coefficients of -0.11, -0.08, -0.06, and -0.06, 
respectively. The highest coefficient (lowest adjustment speed) is that of Market 
Funds (lowadjust1 is insignificant), followed by General Equity Funds, with a 
coefficient of -0.033. The results indicate that more specialized funds are able to 
improve performance more quickly when the fund underperforms, which gives 
investors in these funds an advantage. 
Table 2.5 presents the fixed effect estimation for the asymmetric partial 
adjustment model across different fund styles using the Treynor ratio as the  
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Table 2.4: Monthly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation Across Fund Styles: Sharpe Ratio     
Monthly Fixed Effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment model for each U.S. equity mutual fund style subsample (See Table 
2.1) from January 2000 to December 2012. The Dependent variable is the Sharpe Ratio. Independent variables include the Market Sharpe 
Ratio and the average Sharpe Ratio for a mutual fund having a similar Lipper Classification. Second order lags of the dependent variable are 
also included to ensure proper specification of the model. T-stats are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Emerging 
Markets 
General 
Equity Global 
Global 
Focused 
Inter-
national 
Inter-
national 
Focused Market Sector 
Intercept 0.0799*** 0.0199*** 0.0405*** 0.0359*** 0.0229** 0.0539*** 0.0020** 0.0426*** 
4.65 5.40 5.15 3.56 2.23 4.82 2.16 8.08 
highadjust1 0.3304*** 0.1739*** 0.2659*** 0.1435*** 0.2720*** 0.2979*** 0.0148*** 0.2302*** 
5.23 6.37 6.14 3.35 4.19 4.70 2.64 7.24 
highadjust2 0.0001 0.0006** 0.1026** 0.0001 0.0936 0.2020*** -0.0025 0.0003*** 
1.42 2.15 2.45 0.67 1.52 3.38 -0.77 3.51 
lowadjust1 -0.1072** -0.0324* -0.0824*** -0.0609** -0.0677* -0.0410 -0.0036 -0.1126*** 
-1.97 -1.87 -2.90 -2.05 -1.65 -1.08 -1.34 -4.67 
lowadjust2 -0.0878 -0.0002* 0.0003** -0.1152*** 0.0010*** -0.1205*** -0.0055* -0.0001 
-1.59 -1.80 2.12 -3.92 3.73 -3.23 -1.82 -0.74 
Market Sharpe 0.8990*** 0.9539*** 0.8664*** 0.9042*** 0.7727*** 0.7101*** 0.0014 0.7113*** 
13.55 58.75 26.49 22.78 15.14 13.21 0.11 27.21 
Classification Sharpe 0.0320 0.0171*** 0.0038 0.0184** 0.0958*** 0.0282 0.9871*** 0.0224* 
1.60 2.83 0.58 2.46 2.85 1.28 78.62 1.94 
R-Square 0.579 0.759 0.605 0.719 0.661 0.545 0.994 0.516 
No. of Funds 559 15,893 1,337 928 2,212 603 284 2,222 
N 40,100 1,289,108 86,781 43,121 176,418 41,935 27,159 161,093 
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dependent variable.  Again, we see results that are consistent with the full sample 
estimation of asymmetric adjustment – adjustment speed when the Treynor ratio is 
above the equilibrium value is relatively lower than when the Sharpe ratio is below 
the equilibrium value, which justifies the use of the asymmetric version of the 
partial adjustment model in the context of mutual fund performance. This result is 
consistent across all types of equity mutual funds specified in this study.  Also 
consistent with the results in Table 2.4, the Market Return and Classification 
Treynor coefficients are consistently positive and significant across fund styles, 
which is coincides with a priori expectations.  Due to the construction of the testing 
methodology, we again find a very high R-squared value for Market Index Funds of 
0.965. R-squared values for other fund types range from 0.256 for International 
Focused Funds to 0.588 for Global Focused Funds. 
Most importantly, we find similar to those presented in Table 2.4 when 
comparing speeds of adjustment across fund styles when using the Treynor ratio as 
the dependent variable.  When funds over perform, more specialized firms that 
typically charge higher fees and produce more information are able to maintain a 
performance advantage in terms of the speed of adjustment.  Recall that, in the 
context of mutual fund adjustment, when the fund is performing well, statistically 
significant slower adjustment speed indicates better managerial skill. Table 2.5 
shows that the highest highadjust1 coefficient (slowest adjustment speed) is 
reported for Emerging Market Funds at 0.23, implying that 77 percent of the 
deviation is offset in one period. International, International Focused, Sector, and 
Global Funds are also among the slowest to adjust, with coefficients of 0.15, 0.16, 
0.13, and 0.10, respectively. The fact that adjustment speeds for specialized types of 
funds like Emerging Market and International Focused Funds are lower when the 
funds over perform implies that these fund managers have some advantage in 
portfolio allocation, and information advantages have long been cited in the 
literature as a potential explanation. 
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Table 2.5: Monthly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation Across Fund Styles: Treynor Ratio     
Monthly Fixed Effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment model for each U.S. equity mutual fund style subsample (See Table 
2.1) from January 2000 to December 2012. The Dependent variable is the Treynor Ratio. Independent variables include the Market Return 
(market beta is zero) and the average Treynor Ratio for a mutual fund having a similar Lipper Classification. Second order lags of the 
dependent variable are also included to ensure proper specification of the model. T-stats are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Emerging 
Markets 
General 
Equity Global 
Global 
Focused 
Inter-
national 
Inter-
national 
Focused Market Sector 
Intercept 0.1003*** 0.0225*** 0.0037 0.0282** 0.0247 0.1030*** 0.0032 0.0534*** 
3.26 4.24 0.33 2.41 1.25 4.56 0.80 6.64 
highadjust1 0.2333*** 0.0942*** 0.0973** 0.0770 0.1534*** 0.1618*** -0.0138 0.1270*** 
2.68 2.89 2.39 1.54 2.74 2.85 -0.83 3.88 
highadjust2 0.0047 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0088 0.0002 -0.0020*** -0.0088 0.0000 
0.98 1.60 2.81 1.60 0.61 -2.73 -0.70 -0.69 
lowadjust1 -0.0260 -0.0061 0.0488 0.0091 -0.0075 -0.0764** -0.0042 -0.0311 
-0.53 -0.26 1.53 0.24 -0.17 -2.22 -0.20 -1.17 
lowadjust2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0009*** -0.0186 0.0001*** 
-1.01 -0.65 0.64 -6.20 -0.38 4.32 -1.33 2.85 
Market Return 0.0740*** 0.0522*** 0.0550*** 0.0562*** 0.0651*** 0.0669*** 0.0266*** 0.0470*** 
14.14 53.99 30.62 30.26 17.03 15.43 2.64 30.33 
Classification Treynor 0.0162*** 0.0001** 0.0020* 0.0038 0.0085 0.0026 0.4210** 0.0074** 
3.91 2.55 1.72 0.86 1.50 0.47 2.04 2.49 
R-Square 0.431 0.477 0.304 0.588 0.406 0.256 0.965 0.303 
No. of Funds 559 15,893 1,337 928 2,212 603 284 2,222 
N 40,100 1,289,108 86,781 43,121 176,418 41,935 27,159 161,093 
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The speed of adjustment results when the Treynor Ratio is below the 
equilibrium value are somewhat different than the results presented in Table 2.4. 
The lowadjust1 coefficient is insignificant for all style subsamples except one 
(International Focused), which implies that there is full adjustment within one 
period.  When using the Treynor Ratio as the dependent variable, Table 2.5 shows 
that focused funds, who typically acquire more information, seem to be better able 
to sustain relatively good fund performance; however, there is no statistically 
significant evidence that there are differences in the speed of adjustment across 
fund styles when the funds underperform, relative to the equilibrium. However, 
consistent with the results in Table 2.4, full  adjustment within one period when 
funds underperform is consistent low costs of portfolio rebalancing, relative to the 
benefits of maintaining a competitive portfolio in a saturated market for mutual 
funds. 
Table 2.6 presents the fixed effect estimation for the asymmetric partial 
adjustment model across different fund styles with alpha as the dependent variable.  
In general, we see results that are consistent with the full sample estimation, as 
well as those of Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The speed of adjustment when alpha is above 
the equilibrium is lower than when alpha is above the equilibrium. Also, certain 
types of funds that typically engage in more information producing activities exhibit 
more optimal adjustment behavior than those who are typically more passive and 
less focused on producing information advantages. The highadjust1 coefficient for 
the Market Funds is much higher (0.40) than in previous estimations. This is likely 
an erroneous result, because the application of the partial adjustment model with 
alpha as the dependent variable is questionable for market index funds, since these 
funds should not exhibit abnormal returns. Similar to previous results, we find that 
the lowadjust1 coefficient is lowest for Emerging Market, Global, and Sector Funds 
at -0.12, -0.09, and -0.06, respectively, implying faster adjustment. On the other 
hand, the lowadjust1 coefficient is insignificant for Market Funds. 
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Table 2.6: Monthly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation Across Fund Styles: Alpha       
Monthly Fixed Effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment model for each U.S. equity mutual fund style subsample (See 
Table 2.1) from January 2000 to December 2012. The Dependent variable is Jensen’s alpha. Independent variables include the 
average alpha for a mutual fund having a similar Lipper Classification. Second order lags of the dependent variable are also included 
to ensure proper specification of the model. T-stats are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Emerging 
Markets 
General 
Equity Global 
Global 
Focused 
Inter-
national 
Inter-
national 
Focused Market Sector 
Intercept 0.0340*** 0.0041*** 0.0094** 0.0081*** 0.0053** 0.0116*** 0.0027 0.0303*** 
2.59 4.12 2.10 3.60 2.11 4.80 1.55 3.50 
highadjust1 0.1389*** 0.0997*** 0.1814** 0.0530** 0.0740** 0.0632*** 0.4059*** 0.1318*** 
2.65 3.58 2.28 1.98 2.24 3.15 2.81 4.07 
highadjust2 0.0006 0.0026 0.0361 0.0104 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0738 0.0613 
0.95 0.51 0.85 0.38 -0.17 0.03 -0.83 1.59 
lowadjust1 -0.1154*** -0.0245* -0.0874** -0.0479** -0.0409** -0.0262** -0.0786 -0.0566* 
-2.65 -1.92 -2.53 -2.00 -2.15 -2.38 -1.07 -1.81 
lowadjust2 0.0327 0.0167 0.0053 -0.0241 0.0098 -0.0170 0.1213 -0.0442* 
0.63 0.91 0.15 -1.20 0.67 -1.50 1.21 -1.75 
Classification Alpha 0.7327*** 0.8917*** 0.8163*** 0.9156*** 0.9286*** 0.9043*** 1.0789*** 0.4104** 
5.14 57.53 24.38 53.56 79.28 79.17 13.24 2.41 
R-Square 0.630 0.411 0.552 0.606 0.758 0.755 0.708 0.343 
No. of Funds 559 15,898 1,337 928 2,212 603 284 2,223 
N 40,105 1,289,325 86,789 43,136 176,438 41,945 27,159 161,134 
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In general, we find consistent evidence of heterogeneity in adjustment speeds 
when estimating an asymmetric partial adjustment model across different fund 
styles using three different measures of risk-adjusted return. We find that mutual 
funds adjust more slowly when outperforming on a risk-adjusted basis then when 
underperforming – a result that makes intuitive sense, given the lack of incentive 
for managers to adjust when results are good. In contrast, when funds 
underperform, managers appear to quickly offset (and perhaps reverse) the 
deviation from equilibrium, indicating the costs of underperformance are high. 
Additionally, firms that exhibit higher returns and charge higher fees, like 
emerging market and sector funds, tend to be relatively more efficient. These 
results are consistent with active managers who expend resources in order to gain 
informational advantages that allow them to not only achieve higher returns, but 
also allow them to rebalance in a timelier manner. As shown in previous literature, 
active managers seem to demand a premium for these advantages in the form of 
higher expenses. 
2.8 Time-Varying Mutual Fund Adjustment Speeds 
In Sections 2.6 and 2.7, we provide evidence that mutual fund managers 
quickly adjust their portfolios when portfolio performance is below that of the 
market equilibrium, and that the speeds at which funds adjust is heterogeneous 
across different styles of funds. We link the differences in adjustment speeds across 
fund styles to information advantage acquired by more actively managed, focused 
funds; however, there have been significant changes in information production costs 
over the past several decades. In particular, the efficiency of information 
dissemination and production has significantly increased with the use of technology, 
and this trend has been driving increasingly open and integrated financial markets. 
Based on the fact that information has become more efficient over time, we 
expect that mutual funds have become more efficient at producing information, and, 
thus, we should observe an increase in speed of adjustment over time.  To test this 
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hypothesis, we estimate the monthly fixed effect asymmetric partial adjustment 
model from (8) for the full U.S.-based equity mutual fund sample for each year.  We 
then capture the speed of adjustment coefficients (one minus the lowadjust1 and 
highadjust1 coefficients) and examine the trend from 2000 to 2012. 
Figure 2.1 presents the speed of adjustment estimates for the full mutual 
fund sample over time using the Sharpe ratio as the measure of risk adjusted 
return.  The results show that the speeds of adjustment remain mostly consistent 
over the sample period under study. Highadjust1 is generally lower than 
lowadjust1, which is consistent with the benefits of active management. Active or 
more informationally efficient managers are able to succeed in quickly offsetting 
deviations when the fund underperforms, while maintaining the good performance 
(for a short while) when the fund does well.  More relevant to the information 
hypothesis, there also appears to be some cyclicality in the speeds of adjustment. 
For example, the speed of adjustment when funds underperform tends to increase 
when the economy is good and decline during a recession. This can be seen in Figure 
2.1 as reductions in Low SOA around 2001 and 2008.  Conversely, the speed of 
adjustment when funds perform well tends to decrease during good economic times 
and increase during a recession.  Figure 2.1 shows that High SOA tends to increase 
around 2001 and 2008, but decreases afterwards.  The yearly trends in speed of 
adjustment are consistent with mutual fund managers being more efficient during 
good economic times. The most likely explanation of this result is consistent with 
the information production ability mutual funds. In Section 2.7 of this study, we 
show that certain funds that tend to focus on producing and utilizing more specific 
information tend to be more efficient in terms of portfolio rebalancing.  Figure 2.1 
supports the role that information plays in mutual fund portfolio adjustment ability 
by showing that, during times when information becomes more uncertain and costly 
to acquire for all funds, like during an economic recession, mutual funds are not 
able to rebalance their portfolios as efficiently. 
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Figure 2.1: Asymmetric Speeds of Adjustment, 2000 - 2012 
Estimates of the speed of adjustment parameters from the asymmetric partial adjustment model for the full sample of U.S.-based equity 
mutual funds from January 2000 to December 2012. The dependent variable is the monthly Sharpe Ratio. High SOA is the speed of 
adjustment when fund returns are above the optimum. Low SOA is the speed of adjustment when fund returns are below the optimum. 
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2.9 Robustness and Possible Extensions 
In previous sections, we provide empirical results using several monthly 
performance ratios that are computed using daily data. However, the use of daily 
data and the short estimation window can bias the calculation of the performance 
measures, and, hence, the speed of adjustment estimation. In order to ensure 
robustness of the results presented, the frequency of the data can be expanded to 
include the calculation of the risk-adjusted measures of return over a longer time 
period in order to ensure consistent results. In Tables 2.7 and 2.8, we provide 
results supporting the robustness of the previous results by estimating the speed of 
adjustment using measures of risk-adjusted return that are computed over a longer 
time period. Table 2.7 reports results for the speed of adjustment estimation using 
the Sharpe ratio computed on a quarterly and yearly basis as the dependent 
variable for the full sample of U.S. equity funds. In Panel A of Table 2.7, daily data 
is used to compute quarterly estimates of the Sharpe ratio, and in Panel B, the 
CRSP monthly return data are used to compute yearly measures of risk-adjusted 
return. The dependent variable used in Table 2.7 is the Sharpe Ratio, because this 
ratio is less dependent on correctly specifying a correct asset pricing model19. A 
priori, we expect that our results should weaken when the models are estimated 
using longer estimation windows when calculating the performance measures, 
because, over longer horizons, the equilibrium return should hold. As a 
consequence, a manager’s ability to maintain long-run advantages should diminish, 
so funds should exhibit full adjustment in the long run. Additionally, we also expect 
the model to show a better fit over longer time horizons, since the impact of fund 
idiosyncrasies and random movements are diminished in the long-run. The results 
in Table 2.7 support these expectations and confirm the results presented in 
previous sections. 
                                                        
19 Failure to properly account for the correct market model specification in calculating risk-adjusted 
returns, as in the Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha, can bias the speed of adjustment estimation. 
Although, previous results show results that are generally consistent across performance measures. 
In addition, unreported regressions using additional measures of risk-adjusted return show no 
appreciable difference in the inferences provided in Table 7. 
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The highadjust1 coefficient for the estimation utilizing quarterly estimates of 
the Sharpe ratio reported in Panel A is 0.103, compared with that reported for the 
estimation using yearly estimates in Panel B of 0.013. An increase in adjustment 
speed when funds surpass the equilibrium return implies that any advantage that 
mutual fund managers may have in generating persistently above average results 
diminishes over time.  On the other hand, the lowadjust1 coefficients appear to 
remain consistent over time, having reported values of -0.035 (not statistically 
significant) in Panel A and -0.062 (p-value=0.076) in Panel B, which are similar to 
that reported in Panel A of Table 2.3 of -0.047. Therefore, we find consistent 
evidence showing mutual funds exhibiting sub-optimal Sharpe Ratios tend to offset 
and reverse the deviation by approximately 105 percent over the next period, and 
this result is consistent across several estimation horizons. Consistently significant, 
negative coefficients for lowadjust1 also give support to previous results showing 
that mutual funds managers actively strive to quickly reverse negative 
performance. In addition, over longer time horizons, the R-squared values from the 
estimations increase from 0.752 in Panel A to 0.834 in Panel B (compared with 
0.706 in Table 2.3, Panel A), because performance measures converge to the 
equilibrium over longer horizons. 
In a second set of results presented in Section 2.7, we examine the speed of 
adjustment across funds of different styles and show that mutual fund adjustment 
speeds are heterogeneous across fund types. As a robustness check of this result, we 
estimate the speed of adjustment using Sharpe ratios calculated over quarterly 
intervals, and the results are presented in Table 2.820. The results are generally 
consistent with those reported in Section 2.7. The highadjust1 coefficients are 
highest for International Focused and Sector Funds, meaning that these funds have 
the slowest adjustment when performance is above the optimum. Conversely, 
Market Funds have the lowest highadjust1 coefficient, and it is also insignificant.  
                                                        
20 In unreported regressions, we also estimate the speed of adjustment across fund styles using 
Treynor Ratios and Alpha as the measure of return as well as using yearly estimates calculated 
using monthly data. Results are generally consistent. 
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Table 2.7: Quarterly and Yearly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation 
Quarterly and yearly fixed effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment 
model presented in Eqs. (8)-(10) for U.S.-based equity mutual funds from January 
2000 to December 2012. The Dependent variable is the Sharpe Ratio. Independent 
variables are the market Sharpe Ratio and the Sharpe Ratio of the average fund in 
the same Lipper Class. Second order lags of the dependent variable are also included 
to ensure proper specification of the model. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Quarterly Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.0126*** 0.0048 2.641 0.008 
highadjust1 0.1032** 0.0448 2.305 0.021 
highadjust2 0.0007 0.0006 1.226 0.220 
lowadjust1 -0.0346 0.0341 -1.015 0.310 
lowadjust2 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.275 0.783 
Market Sharpe 0.9421*** 0.0387 24.318 0.000 
Classification Sharpe 0.0057 0.0036 1.597 0.110 
R-Square 0.752 
No. of Funds 23,198 
N 602,017       
Panel B: Yearly Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.0469** 0.0230 2.042 0.041 
highadjust1 0.0133 0.0823 0.161 0.872 
highadjust2 0.0754 0.0537 1.405 0.160 
lowadjust1 -0.0628* 0.0354 -1.776 0.076 
lowadjust2 -0.0537* 0.0302 -1.777 0.076 
Market Sharpe 0.8922*** 0.0510 17.479 0.000 
Classification Sharpe 0.0001 0.0025 0.037 0.971 
R-Square 0.834 
No. of Funds 24,158 
N 123,302       
 92 
Additionally, lowadjust1 is lowest for Sector and Global Focused funds, which 
means that these types of funds can most quickly reverse their fortunes after 
achieving suboptimal results. Market Funds, on the other hand, have a high 
coefficient value, implying that they are less efficient than their peers. The results 
presented in Table 2.8 support the robustness of those presented in Section 2.7. 
Mutual funds that typically specialize in expending resources for the purpose of 
producing information advantages, like Sector and Global Focused Funds, are able 
to more efficiently rebalance their portfolios than more passive, Market Funds. The 
ability of funds that produce more information to achieve more optimal portfolio 
adjustment is an advantage to actively managed funds that has previously been 
unaddressed in the mutual fund literature. 
There are other areas of robustness and potential extensions of the results 
shown here that may expand the mutual fund literature in future research. For 
example, the dependent variables in our main estimations of adjustment speed are 
measures of risk-adjusted mutual fund returns defined by the Sharp ratio, Treynor 
ratio, and alpha. There are, however, several other measures that may be used in 
order to ensure robustness of the results presented. For example, a multi-factor 
model like that of Fama and French (1993) could be used to calculate expected 
returns. An advantage of these measures is that they incorporate more complex 
asset-pricing models into the measurement of risk-adjusted return. However, a 
drawback of such a methodology is that, if these asset pricing models are not 
correctly specified, which has been an area of contention in empirical research, then 
the resulting speed of adjustment estimates may be biased. Additionally, using 
rolling estimation windows may also provide robustness to the results presented. 
Finally, the results presented in this analysis focus mostly on macroeconomic 
and fund-style characteristics as determining the long-run risk-adjusted fund 
equilibrium. By using the fixed effect methodology, we ignore the impact of any 
idiosyncratic, fund-specific characteristics. These characteristics are captured in the 
intercept and error terms of the models, and the errors are not correlated with the  
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Table 2.8: Quarterly Asymmetric Partial Adjustment Estimation Across Fund Styles : Sharpe Ratio   
Quarterly Fixed Effect estimations of the asymmetric partial adjustment model for each U.S. equity mutual fund style subsample (See 
Table 1) from January 2000 to December. The Dependent variable is the Sharpe Ratio. Independent variables are the market Sharpe 
Ratio and the Sharpe Ratio of the average fund in the same Lipper Class. Second order lags of the dependent variable are also included 
to ensure proper specification of the model. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Emerging 
Markets 
General 
Equity Global 
Global 
Focused 
Inter-
national 
Inter-
national 
Focused Market Sector 
Intercept 0.0109*** 0.0107*** 0.0324*** 0.0198** 0.0082 0.0138** 0.0012* 0.0314*** 
3.40 2.65 3.06 2.24 0.72 2.39 1.72 5.32 
highadjust1 0.0516*** 0.0834** 0.1466** 0.0925 0.1243 0.1491*** 0.0030 0.1390*** 
2.74 2.17 2.27 1.44 1.18 2.67 0.88 3.07 
highadjust2 0.0325 0.0005 0.2340*** 0.2296*** 0.2237** 0.1012** -0.0031 0.2096*** 
1.58 1.28 3.89 4.00 2.02 2.02 -0.49 3.97 
lowadjust1 -0.0378** -0.0285 -0.0209 -0.0606 0.0140 -0.0272 -0.0057 -0.0712* 
-2.42 -0.99 -0.36 -1.31 0.18 -1.46 -1.27 -1.75 
lowadjust2 -0.0404*** -0.0002 -0.1371*** -0.0800* 0.0004*** -0.0568** -0.0028 -0.1020*** 
-2.89 -1.58 -3.43 -1.70 2.60 -2.04 -1.06 -3.70 
Market Sharpe 0.0325 0.9771*** 0.8925*** 0.7708*** 0.9312*** 0.2566* 0.0524 0.4995*** 
1.30 34.29 14.13 7.97 11.09 1.77 1.52 4.13 
Classification Sharpe 0.9495*** 0.0037 0.0175 0.1848*** 0.0235 0.6682*** 0.9389*** 0.2942* 
46.11 1.39 0.82 2.61 1.27 4.02 25.24 1.85 
R-Square 0.936 0.808 0.671 0.779 0.681 0.845 0.998 0.683 
No. of Funds 564 16,036 1,346 936 2,235 610 285 2,231 
N 13,120 414,658 27,833 14,339 56,822 13,534 8,774 52,937 
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independent variables. Thus, our speed of adjustment estimates are consistent; 
however, we cannot examine the relationship between individual fund 
characteristics and speed of adjustment. The CRSP mutual fund dataset provides 
data on certain fund-specific characteristics such as information regarding 
management fees, manager tenure, fund age, and turnover. This data can be used 
in an extension of this study to analyze the relationship between key fund-specific 
variables and the speed of adjustment. An analysis of the fund-specific 
determinants of adjustment speed will expand on the efficacy of the results of this 
paper, as it will provide additional implications for mutual fund governance. In 
unreported regressions, we test for potential firm-specific determinants of speed of 
adjustment, but have yet to find conclusive results. 
2.10 Conclusion 
Mutual Funds and other pooling arrangements have become increasingly 
important instruments in the financial markets over the past several decades.  The 
benefits of low cost diversification and the ability of lay investors to receive active, 
professional portfolio management has allowed many more investors to access the 
capital markets. The resulting increase in available capital has helped fuel the 
increasingly expanding financial markets.  It is, therefore, important to analyze and 
understand how efficiently mutual funds are able to allocate funds for their 
investors, thereby giving them the best risk-adjusted return. 
The mutual fund manager plays a key role in the ability of mutual funds to 
allocate assets to create the most efficient portfolios.  The managers are charged 
with achieving the highest risk-adjusted level of return for their investors, given 
their fund’s objective.  Overall market fundamentals drive the equilibrium level of 
risk-adjusted return attainable in the financial markets, but a manager’s allocation 
decisions can determine whether an individual fund will fall below or above the 
market equilibrium in any given period.  When a fund’s performance is below that 
of the equilibrium level, the fund manager has an incentive the rebalance the 
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portfolio in an attempt to close the performance gap.  The consequence of not re-
allocating quickly enough is a flow of funds away from the fund. However, portfolio 
rebalancing is costly. Trading costs as well as information costs, which must be 
passed on to the investors, make the manager reluctant to engage in unnecessary 
rebalancing, especially when random price changes may offset his or her actions.  
Thus, the mutual fund manager faces a problem of tradeoff. He or she must balance 
the benefits of quickly reversing poor fund performance by rebalancing the portfolio 
with the trading and information costs necessary to engage in that rebalancing. As 
a result, mutual fund managers may only choose to partially adjust to deviations 
from the risk-adjusted equilibrium return. 
We apply an asymmetric partial adjustment model to a panel data set of 
U.S.-based, equity mutual funds from January of 2000 through December of 2012. 
We estimate the speed at which mutual funds adjust to the equilibrium risk-
adjusted return as a measure of mutual fund efficiency and report several 
significant results.  Firstly, we show that when fund performance is below the 
equilibrium, the average fund offsets the performance gap by roughly 105 percent 
within one period, implying that firms that underperform in one period tend to 
outperform in the next period. In contrast, when a mutual fund’s performance 
exceeds the equilibrium return, only 80 percent of the deviation is offset within one 
period, which reflects the fund manager’s lack of incentive to adjust the portfolio 
when performance is good.  These results imply that mutual funds appear to be 
relatively efficient in terms of portfolio rebalancing, as mangers appear to be willing 
and able to rebalance towards (or above) the equilibrium risk-adjusted return.  
Additionally, a fast adjustment speed when funds underperform implies that 
managers view the cost of persistent underperformance as being high – a result 
that is supported by related literature. 
Secondly, we divide the sample into eight sub-categories based on the mutual 
fund’s style or focus. The results show that funds that typically focus on producing 
more specialized information and purchasing securities in specific markets or 
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industries, like emerging market and sector funds, have more efficient adjustment 
speeds than those that invest in broader categories of securities, like market index 
and generic equity funds.  This result is consistent with the idea that more active 
mutual fund managers are able to take advantage of the information they are 
paying to produce. The evidence presented supports the idea that more active 
managers have information advantages that help them achieve above average 
returns as well as more efficient portfolio rebalancing. It is also shown that 
investors pay a premium for this advantage in the form of higher expense ratios. 
Finally, by applying the partial adjustment model to the sample of mutual funds 
over time, we show that mutual fund managers tend to more efficiently rebalance 
portfolios during good economic times. This evidence implies that portfolio 
managers (and possibly all inventors) lose some information advantages during 
times when uncertainty is high in the financial markets. 
The results shown in this paper have significant implications for investors, 
mutual fund managers, and mutual fund governance. We contribute significantly to 
the literature by looking at the time dimension of the fund manager’s rebalancing 
decision. The efficiency with which fund managers are able to adjust to deviations 
from the equilibrium risk-adjusted return may represent a benefit of active portfolio 
management that has previously been left un-quantified.  We show that the higher 
costs and turnover ratios for mutual funds that focus on more specific market 
segments may be offset not only by higher realized returns, but also by more 
efficient portfolio rebalancing. 
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